Category: Courts

Second Amendment Roundup: Delaware’s “Assault Weapon” Ban Argued in 3rd Circuit
Likelihood of prevailing on a constitutional claim may suffice for a preliminary injunction.

The Third Circuit heard oral argument on March 11 in a challenge to Delaware’s ban on so-called “assault weapons” and ammunition magazines that hold over 17 rounds. Three overlapping cases were consolidated for argument on appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction. Before the Court got into the meat of the Second Amendment dispute, Judge Stephanos Bibas raised a question about the preliminary injunction standard as it applies in Second Amendment cases: do the plaintiffs need to show that every preliminary injunction factor weighs in their favor, or is it enough to show they are likely to succeed on the merits?

The Supreme Court refers to the preliminary injunction as “an extraordinary remedy” that requires plaintiffs to make a “clear showing” on four factors before being granted: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that they face irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (3) that the balance of the equities favor them, and (4) that the public interest would be served by the injunction. The plaintiffs in Delaware focused on the first point—that they were likely to show the laws they challenged violate their Second Amendment rights. Judge Bibas questioned whether that was enough.

It should be. In fact, while there are putatively four factors to be considered in granting a preliminary injunction, in litigation against the government over the constitutionality of a law, in practice they tend to collapse. In such cases, “likelihood of success” is “the first among equals” and is typically dispositive,   L.W. by & through Williams v. Skrmetti (6th Cir. 2023), and the third and the fourth factors, the public interest and the balance of the equities are considered as one. Nken v. Holder (U.S. 2009). Furthermore, if plaintiffs show that the law they challenge violates the Constitution, then those final factors necessarily weigh in their favor, because “the enforcement of an unconstitutional law vindicates no public interest.” K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain School District (3d Cir. 2013).

The same should be true for irreparable harm as well, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in its Second Amendment decision in Baird v. Bonta (2023), where it explained that “in cases involving a constitutional claim, a likelihood of success on the merits usually establishes irreparable harm, and strongly tips the balances of equities and public interest in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.”

Irreparable harm was the focus of Judge Bibas’s questioning in the Delaware argument. It is black-letter law, as the Supreme Court held in 2020 in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” There is every reason to think the same is true for the Second Amendment. “Irreparable harm” is an injury that cannot be easily measured in (and therefore compensated by) monetary damages. Some circuits have recognized that any constitutional right deprivation is necessarily “irreparable.” Melendres v. Arapaio (9th Cir. 2012). And the Third Circuit has extended it at least to cover Fourth Amendment rights, noting that “[p]ersons who can establish that they are being denied their constitutional rights are entitled to relief, and it can no longer be seriously contended that an action for money damages will serve to adequately remedy unconstitutional searches and seizures.” Lewis v. Kugler (1971). As the Supreme Court made clear in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022), the Second Amendment deserves equal treatment with the other protections in the Bill or Rights.

In alignment with this, the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago (2011) answered Judge Bibas’s question well when it noted that “[t]he loss of a First Amendment right is frequently presumed to cause irreparable harm based on the intangible nature of the benefits flowing from the exercise of those rights. . . . The Second Amendment protects similarly intangible and unquantifiable interests. Heller held that the Amendment’s central component is the right to possess firearms for protection. Infringements of this right cannot be compensated by damages.”

The limited scenarios in which a constitutional injury does not entitle a litigant to injunctive relief—in the Fifth Amendment takings context, for instance, where the proper remedy is money damages—supports the line the Seventh Circuit drew between “tangible” and “intangible” (but nevertheless real) injuries. Where plaintiffs show a likelihood of success in proving such an intangible injury, it follows that their injury is “irreparable” in nature.

At the Delaware argument, one of the attorneys defending the law argued that an injunction should not be the automatic result in a case showing likelihood of success in proving a constitutional violation, pointing to the Purcell principle. The Purcell principle, named after the Supreme Court case Purcell v. Gonzalez (2006), is the rule that courts should ordinarily not enjoin challenged election laws shortly before an election is set to occur, out of concern that such an injunction could result in voter confusion. But the Purcell principle is the exception that proves the rule—it speaks only to a very narrow circumstance where an injunction should not enter immediately (though to be sure, election laws can be enjoined immediately after the election upon a showing of constitutional infirmity) because of unique concerns about the fairness of elections. That the Delaware law’s defenders would look to such a dissimilar context shows how little they have to support their position.

One other point of interest from this argument. The Third Circuit panel showed some concern that the plaintiffs were pointing to information that was not technically in the preliminary injunction “record” of evidence submitted to the trial court. Judge Bibas asked the attorney for Delaware whether it was appropriate to look at such evidence because it went toward proving certain “legislative facts.” The attorney’s responded, “The very fact that they are citing expert declarations that plaintiffs in other cases chose to submit to those courts, but that for whatever reason, these plaintiffs chose not to submit here, is precisely evidence that these are adjudicative facts. . . . [and] that this is for trial courts to deal with on the record that is presented before them.” That betrayed a serious misunderstanding of the legislative facts that are crucial to Second Amendment (and a lot of other constitutional) litigation.

Legislative facts, as opposed to adjudicative facts, are not the sort of facts typically “found” through trials; they are not case specific but instead are general facts about the world. For instance, whether a plaintiff in a Second Amendment case desires to acquire an AR-15 rifle is an adjudicative fact; it is a fact specific to the plaintiff. Whether AR-15 rifles are in common use for lawful purposes, on the other hand, is a general fact about the world and therefore a legislative fact. The distinction matters because the rules of evidence only constrain courts with respect to adjudicative facts—as far as legislative facts are concerned, a court can find them based on record evidence, or it can find them based on its own research, or by reviewing law review articles and social science papers cited by the parties in their briefs.

And importantly, when a district court makes a decision based on legislative facts, its “findings” do not receive deference from the appellate courts. This makes sense, given that legislative facts are frequently the sort of facts that are used as the foundation for legal rules. That some legislative facts might be found in expert reports (or found in the sources an expert might otherwise cite) does not matter at all to their classification or to whether other courts can consider them without an expert submission of their own.

Take, as a particularly relevant example, the fact that the handgun is the most preferred firearm in America for self-defense is a legislative fact. Regardless of whether the district court received evidence on that question, and irrespective of what it might have purported to “find” about the topic, the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) was free to make its own decision, as the court of last resort in deciding constitutional questions, handling a legislative fact of relevance to constitutional reasoning. And that’s what makes Delaware’s whole argument so strange. Not only was Heller unrestricted by lower court findings on this issue, there actually were no such findings. Heller was working with a blank canvas. In that case, and in Bruen, the district court had disposed of the case without building any record at all. And yet, both Heller and Bruen made all sorts of factual assertions about firearm use, features, and history, all issues of legislative facts presented to it through the parties’ briefs, amicus submissions, and through its own research. It did not matter one whit that there had been no findings on those issues and in fact in both cases it declined to remand for development of an evidentiary record.

If the Third Circuit is considering constraining parties to a narrow “record” in resolving constitutional claims, it will have to look somewhere other than the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment caselaw to justify such a rule.

Appeals Court Ruling Poses Danger of Confiscation of All Firearms

An Obama-appointed judge in Rhode Island authored an exceedingly dangerous opinion last week, rejecting arguments that the state’s ban on magazines holding more than 10 rounds was unconstitutional. Instead, Judge William Kayatta, a graduate of Harvard Law School, built the case cleverly, declaring that LCMs (large capacity magazines) weren’t protected under the Second Amendment and, by implication, neither are the firearms they feed.

At issue was the law passed in 2022 — HB 6614 — banning the possession of LCMs, with violations being declared a felony and violators facing five years in jail upon conviction. In other words, law-abiding citizens would lose not only their firearms, but their freedoms as well.

Lawsuits brought by pro-Second Amendment advocates were rejected at the district level and, when appealed, the lower court’s decision was affirmed. But Judge Kayatta went further — much further — to build a case that anti-gunners around the country will likely seek to emulate.

The plaintiffs, Ocean State Tactical, doing business in the state as Bear Hunting and Fishing Supply, and four individual gun owners, complained that Rhode Island’s law violated their Second Amendment rights, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

In reviewing and affirming the lower court’s decision denying their complaints, Kayatta wrote that the plaintiffs “failed to prove that LCMs are ‘Arms’ within the meaning of the Second Amendment,” that the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment (“No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”) was not violated by the state law, and that it further “posed no problems under the Fourteenth Amendment.”

There were several pieces of the puzzle Kayatta put together to avoid the demands of Bruen, namely that the state had to provide historical analogues to the infringements in order for them to stand.

Instead,

Given the lack of evidence that LCMs are used in self-defense, it reasonably follows that banning them imposes no meaningful burden on the ability of Rhode Island’s residents to defend themselves.

After discussing the history of states restricting possession of sawed-off shotguns and Bowie knives, he wrote:

In each instance, it seems reasonably clear that our historical tradition of regulating arms used for self-defense has tolerated burdens on the right that are certainly no less than the (at most) negligible burden of having to use more than one magazine to fire more than ten shots.

He then used what he called an “apt analogy” to support the state’s ban: rules on the private accumulation of gun powder. Without mentioning the fact that those state rules were driven by concerns over accidental fires, he wrote:

Founding-era society faced no risk that one person with a gun could, in minutes, murder several dozen individuals. But founding-era communities did face risks posed by the aggregation of large quantities of gunpowder, which could kill many people at once if ignited.

In response to this concern, some governments at the time limited the quantity of gunpowder that a person could possess, and/or limited the amount that could be stored in a single container….

It requires no fancy to conclude that those same founding-era communities may well have responded to today’s unprecedented concern about LCM use just as the Rhode Island General Assembly did: by limiting the number of bullets that could be held in a single magazine.

Indeed, HB 6614 is more modest than founding-era limits on the size of gun-powder containers in that it imposes no limits on the total amount of ammunition that gun owners may possess.

And then he completed the “workaround” he created in order to circumvent Bruen’s demands:

In sum, the burden on self-defense imposed by HB 6614 is no greater than the burdens of longstanding, permissible arms regulations, and its justification compares favorably with the justification for prior bans on other arms found to pose growing threats to public safety.

Applying Bruen’s metrics, our analogical reasoning very likely places LCMs well within the realm of devices that have historically been prohibited once their danger became manifest.

He executed his coup d’etat:

Common sense points in the same direction. It is fair to assume that our founders were, by and large, rational. To conclude that the Second Amendment allows banning sawed-off shotguns, Bowie knives, and M-16s — but not LCMs used repeatedly to facilitate the murder of dozens of men, women, and children in minutes — would belie that assumption.

Accordingly, it should not be surprising that Bruen’s guidance in this case leads us to conclude that HB 6614 is likely both consistent with our relevant tradition of gun regulation and permissible under the Second Amendment.

If this ruling isn’t appealed and overturned, the implication remains: If semi-automatic rifles are similar, if not identical, to military grade M-16s, and the LCMs that feed them can be confiscated and their owners jailed, then it’s a short step to declaring semi-automatic firearms themselves (both rifles and pistols) as contraband, and subject to the same penalties.

It is. Letting unelected, nearly unaccountable, bureaucraps decide, all on their own, what’s illegal is the essence of tyranny. Lazy judges are who allowed ‘deference’ to bureaucrap’s decisions become “law” so they wouldn’t have to stir themselves anymore than they absolutely had to.

The Atlantic Worries Bump Stock Case About More Than Bump Stocks

After the Route 91 massacre, the ATF reclassified bump stocks as machine gun parts. This was done, at least in part, to try and stave off legislation that would have banned not just bump stocks but a whole lot of other things–including, arguably, aftermarket triggers.

But regardless of why it happened, it wasn’t the right decision. The bump stock doesn’t change a semi-automatic into a full-auto weapon; not based on the NFA definition of a machinegun which is a weapon that is capable or can be easily made capable of firing more than one round with a single pull of the trigger. Bump stocks just let you pull the trigger faster, which is perfectly legal, even now.

Over at The Atlantic, they worry that this case may end up being about more than just bump stocks.

Not so long ago, a case like Cargill would not have come down to whether a court agreed with an agency’s interpretation of a statute Congress had tasked it with enforcing.

Indeed, decades of administrative law, including but not limited to the Supreme Court’s 1984 ruling in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, recognized that agency experts were often in a better position to resolve ambiguities in the statutes that Congress tasked them with enforcing than federal judges were.

Thus, it had long been settled that, so long as an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous language in a statute (like what counts as a machine gun) was reasonable, the agency was allowed to act based upon that interpretation…

That was already worrying enough, but what’s alarming in Cargill is that the Court is in the midst of getting rid of deference to agencies outside of the “major questions” context, too. Thus, instead of debating whether ATF’s reaction to the Las Vegas shooting was reasonable (which it clearly was), the oral argument before the Supreme Court devolved into the justices struggling to understand the exact mechanical function of a bump stock—so that they could decide for themselves whether or not it fits within the statutory definition of a “machine gun.”

As even a cursory perusal of the transcript reveals, this wasn’t a high-minded debate about broader points of law; it was nine neophytes trying to understand the mechanics of something they’ve never touched solely by having it described to them.

One comes away from the transcript with the sense that the argument would have been far more productive had it been held on a shooting range. So instead of debating whether the executive branch overreacted or not, the debate was about what, in the abstract, the justices would have done in its place.

Of course, the author clearly frames this as a bad thing. Apparently, if unelected bureaucrats can’t essentially determine law by decree, then something is inherently wrong with our country.

Yet this kind of “thinking” is a major problem with our nation in the first place.

Yes, I get the concept that experts may well be better at understanding complex issues than elected officials who, frankly, write a lot of laws about things they don’t understand and do a poor job of it.

That’s entirely valid.

The problem is that unelected bureaucrats can unilaterally decide something is illegal just so long as they can come up with some reasoning that sort of looks valid. They do this with all sorts of things, not just firearms, but Cargill is a little different. This is something that was declared perfectly legal to sell, then reclassified as illegal simply because it became politically expedient to do so.

If that doesn’t highlight the issues with the current system perfectly, I don’t know what can.

If the ATF can suddenly decide that this device was legal but now isn’t, what’s the next thing they’ll decide is illegal?

While ignorant politicians are a danger, our system was created with the idea that they’d be the ones coming up with the laws and not bureaucrats. If this case turns out to be about more than bump stocks, then you’re going to have a hard time convincing me that it’s a bad thing.

Nevada Court Signals Suit Against Smith & Wesson Is Improper

Amid ongoing litigation brought by anti-gun Smith & Wesson shareholders over continued AR-15 production, Nevada’s Clark County District Court signals no “substantial likelihood” Smith & Wesson will be found liable, saying the activist shareholders appear not to be aligned with the company’s best interest and requiring them to post a half-million-dollar bond to continue their suit.

On December 5, 2023, Breitbart News reported that that lawsuit against Smith & Wesson was brought by a group of anti-gun nuns, shareholders all, who claimed the gun maker “knowingly allowed the Company to become exposed to significant liability for intentionally violating federal, state, and local laws through its manufacturing, marketing, and sales of AR-15 style rifles and similar semiautomatic firearms.”

The plaintiffs made clear they were aware of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) but suggested the Act does would not protect Smith & Wesson because they continued making AR-15s after one of their rifles was used in a high profile shooting.

The nuns suggested the “board’s unwillingness to exercise any oversight whatsoever in connection with the Company’s illicit manufacturing, marketing, and sales of AR-15 rifles” removes the company from PLCAA protections.

However, a record of the February 20, 2024, exchanges between Clark County District Judge Joe Hardy and attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants tells a story which shows Smith & Wesson is unlikely liable in the suit.

Hardy noted various reasons for this unlikelihood, one of which was a victory for the anti-gun shareholders would deliver not “benefit the corporation or its security holders.” The transcript of court proceedings make clear that Hardy does not believe the anti-gun shareholders’ positions are in line with the vast majority of Smith & Wesson shareholders.

On December 5, ,2023, Breitbart News noted that the anti-gun shareholders described AR-15 rifles as “machineguns” which should be regulated under the National Firearms Act (NFA). Having posited this argument, they then claimed Smith & Wesson violates federal law by not limiting sales to buyers who submit to NFA guidelines/requirements.

Moreover, the anti-gun shareholders claimed “AR- 15-style rifles have been the weapon of choice for the killers responsible for the deadliest mass shootings in American history, including the recent mass murders in: (i) Buffalo, New York; (ii) Uvalde, Texas; (iii) Highland Park, Illinois; (iv) Colorado Springs, Colorado; (v) Nashville, Tennessee; (vi) Louisville, Kentucky; (vii) Allen, Texas; and (viii) Lewiston, Maine.”

Ironically, they do not mention the April 16, 2007, Virginia Tech University shooting in which an attacker armed with two handguns killed more people than were killed in any of the seven attacks they laid at the feet of AR-15s. The Virginia Tech attacker killed 32 people.

The court also ruled that the plaintiffs’ use of graphic images in their filings apparently had no legitimate reason to be included.

The judge also required the plaintiffs’ to post $500,000 as a bond in this case, which means that if Smith & Wesson wins, the plaintiffs’ will forfeit that money. This too signals that the judge is skeptical of the merits of the plaintiffs’ arguments, and is making them put real skin in the game to continue the challenge.

AR-15 rifles–and AR-15 variants–are made by numerous companies and comprise the most popular rifle and rifle platform in the United States.

What kind of demand exists for the AR-15 rifle/platform? On January 12, 2024, Breitbart News pointed to National Shooting Sports Foundation numbers showing there were over 28 million AR/AK-style rifles in the U.S. as of 2021, and that figure has certainly seen exponential growth during the past three years.

The suit is Adrian Dominican Sisters v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., No. A-23-882774-B in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada.

Spoiler Alert: ‘Assault Weapons’ Ban ~ Government Must Prove That Weapons Are NOT In Common Use

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Bianchi v. Brown issued an important order that is likely to backfire on the anti-gunners.

The court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing the following two questions:

  • (1) does the determination of whether a weapon is “in common use” occur at the first or second step of Bruen’s text-and-history methodology, and
  • (2) who bears the burden of establishing that a weapon is in common use. Heller and Bruen provide explicit answers to the questions posed by the Fourth Circuit, and those answers favor the protection of our Second Amendment rights.

Bianchi challenges the constitutionality of Maryland’s “assault weapons” ban, which seeks to outlaw the AR-15, among other semiautomatic firearms.

Tellingly, the original Fourth Circuit panel in Bianchi seemed poised to issue a pro-Second Amendment ruling, but before that occurred, the Fourth Circuit took the case en banc likely to avoid the possibility of such an outcome.

Bruen instructs that the constitutional inquiry starts with the text of the Second Amendment. This means that, at the outset, a lower court must determine whether the object of a firearm’s regulation is an “arm.”

At this first step, Bruen instructs that the burden is on the party challenging the firearms regulation to show that the item being banned is an “arm.” Heller defined “arms” as “weapons of offense or armor of defense.” There is no doubt that AR-15s and other semiautomatic rifles subject to the Maryland ban are “arms,” which means that the burden shifts to the government to show that the arms it seeks to ban are not “in common use” by Americans for lawful purposes (or are dangerous and unusual).

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Gun Rights Groups Drawing a Bead on Illinois ‘Assault Weapons’ Law, Taking Issue to Supreme Court

On Monday, the pro-Second Amendment group Gun Owners of America and their affiliate, the Gun Owners Foundation, filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court to forward their challenge to Illinois’s restrictive “assault weapons” law.

 The groups, representing Illinois gun owners, argue the law imposes an unconstitutional, sweeping ban on hundreds of commonly owned and lawfully used rifles and ammunition magazines.

“GOA has been at the forefront of this challenge since before the bans even took effect, and while our goal was never to have to end up before the Supreme Court, we were fully prepared to do so,” said Erich Pratt, senior vice president of Gun Owners of America.

“We urge the Justices to hear the pleas of millions of Americans in Illinois and several other states nationwide who cannot purchase many of the commonly owned semiautomatic firearms available today because of the unconstitutional laws passed by anti-gun politicians,” Pratt said.

The constitutionality argument is especially interesting, coming as it does after the Supreme Court’s Bruen decision, which is generally regarded as having recognized the original meaning of the Second Amendment and has been the cause of much rewriting of laws around concealed carry. Even before Bruen, concealed-carry laws had been on a liberalization trend for some years, in fact since Florida passed the first “shall-issue” law in 1987.

Illinois, not surprisingly, has one of the most draconian “assault weapons” laws in the United States.

The strict gun control law, signed by Democratic Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker last year, carries penalties for anyone who, “Carries or possesses… Manufactures, sells, delivers, imports, or purchases any assault weapon or .50 caliber rifle.”

Those who legally possess a banned weapon under the law must register it with the Illinois State Police.

The law also includes statutory penalties for anyone who “sells, manufactures, delivers, imports, possesses, or purchases any assault weapon attachment or .50 caliber cartridge.”

The law appears to have sparked considerable non-compliance, and deliberate civil disobedience may be part of that trend.

Of the over 2.4 million Firearm Owner Identification (FOID) cardholders, there have only been 112,350 disclosures filed as of Dec. 31, 2023, according to state police data. Another 29,357 disclosures were in the process of being completed as of Jan. 6.

Gun rights activists previously told Fox News Digital that apparent high rates of noncompliance came from a mix of ignorance of what the law requires and civil disobedience.

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Warning shots get ‘self-defense’ protections too, Ohio Supreme Court rules

A Clark County man was entitled to argue self-defense when he intentionally shot toward a person, and was not required to show he intended to kill or harm the man who threatened him, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

A divided Supreme Court vacated the felonious assault conviction of Tyler Wilson for his altercation at a Springfield gas station in 2021. At trial, Wilson was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of felonious assault after he fired a shot at Billy Reffett. The shot struck the window frame of Reffett’s truck, near his head.

The trial judge refused to instruct the jury to consider Wilson’s argument that he acted in self-defense. The judge ruled Wilson was not claiming self-defense because Wilson testified that he did not aim the gun at Reffett and had no intention of harming him but was just trying to get Reffett to “back off.”

In the Court’s lead opinion, Justice Melody Stewart stated that the Ohio self-defense law does not require an intent to harm or kill another, just the “intent to repel or escape force.” Shooting toward another with the intent to stop an aggressor is sufficient to justify a self-defense jury instruction, she concluded.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Clark County Common Pleas Court to vacate Wilson’s sentence and conduct further proceedings.

Justices Michael P. Donnelly and Jennifer Brunner joined Justice Stewart’s opinion. Justice Patrick F. Fischer concurred in judgment only without a written opinion.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Joseph T. Deters wrote that Wilson’s version of what had happened did not warrant a self-defense instruction.

Because Wilson insisted that he was not aiming the gun at Reffett or trying to shoot him, Wilson was arguing that he had not committed felonious assault. Arguing he was not guilty of felonious assault is different than claiming he acted in self-defense, which would require Wilson to admit he attempted to harm Reffett but was justified in doing so, Justice Deters explained.

Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy and Justice R. Patrick DeWine joined Justice Deters’ opinion.

Biden Goes To Court, Demanding Warrantless Surveillance Powers
An attempt to bypass congress.

A request by the Biden administration to the courts for the renewal of contentious warrantless surveillance powers, has stoked controversy.

These surveillance powers, demanded by American intelligence agencies, are on the verge of expiration. Critics argue that this move either reflects business as usual, or reflects a sidestepping of spying reforms.

According to US Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), the decision of the US Department of Justice to pursue an extension of the FISA Section 702 for a year without congressional consideration manifests a disregard for reforms aimed at safeguarding American rights.

Expressing his criticism, Wyden offers an alternative legislation which he and other lawmakers proposed that seeks to maintain Section 702 surveillance albeit under strict regulations constraining unwarranted spying on Americans. Wyden is particularly irked by the White House’s direction to prosecutors to seek renewal of the FISA powers in court before his proposed alternative legislation could be wholly considered by Congress.

Senator Wyden did not mince words in expressing his dissatisfaction with the approach of the Biden administration and the Justice department. “It is utterly ridiculous that the Biden Administration and the Justice Department would rather risk the long-term future of an important surveillance authority than support a single meaningful reform to protect Americans’ rights,” he said.

The contentious issue revolves around Section 702, an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that allows US intelligence agencies to spy on foreigners considered a threat to national security. Despite the fact that this surveillance is meant for overseas intelligence targets, the incidental warrantless surveillance of US residents has prompted concerns among privacy advocates.

The FBI’s past missteps of using Section 702 to snoop on various individuals ranging from US elected officials to campaign donors adds credence to these concerns. Section 702 is scheduled to lapse by April 19 unless Congress moves to renew it. This has led to a push among several lawmakers to alter the rules and add guards against potential future abuse. To keep it running, Congress had granted a four-month extension last year.

There are currently four legislative proposals in the works to renew Section 702. Two of these initiatives, namely the Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act and the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023, entail a warrant requirement prior to investigations.

The White House has resisted attempts to reform Section 702.

California Violated the Second Amendment by Disarming People Based on Nullified Convictions
A federal judge ruled that three men who committed nonviolent felonies decades ago are entitled to buy, own, and possess guns.

The state of California employed Kendall Jones as a correctional officer for 29 years and as a firearms and use-of-force trainer for 19 years. But in 2018, when Jones sought to renew the certificate of eligibility required for firearms instructors, the California Department of Justice (DOJ) informed him that he was not allowed to possess guns under state law because of a 1980 Texas conviction for credit card abuse. Jones committed that third-degree felony in Houston when he was 19, and his conviction was set aside after he completed a probation sentence.

According to the DOJ, that did not matter: Because of his youthful offense, which Jones said involved a credit card he had obtained from someone who falsely claimed he was authorized to use it, the longtime peace officer was permanently barred from owning or possessing firearms in California. That application of California law violated the Second Amendment, a federal judge ruled this week in Linton v. Bonta, which also involves two other similarly situated plaintiffs.

“Plaintiffs were convicted of non-violent felonies decades ago when they were in the earliest years of adulthood,” U.S. District Judge James Donato, a Barack Obama appointee, notes in an order granting them summary judgment. “Each conviction was set aside or dismissed by the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred, and the record indicates that all three plaintiffs have been law-abiding citizens in every respect other than the youthful misconduct. Even so, California has acted to permanently deny plaintiffs the right to possess or own firearms solely on the basis of the original convictions.” After considering the state’s cursory defense of those determinations, Donato thought it was clear that California had “violated the Second Amendment rights of the individual plaintiffs.”

Like most jurisdictions, California prohibits people with felony records from buying, owning, receiving, or possessing firearms. That ban encompasses offenses that did not involve weapons or violence, and it applies regardless of how long ago the crime was committed. Federal law imposes a similar disqualification, which applies to people convicted of crimes punishable by more than a year of incarceration (or more than two years for state offenses classified as misdemeanors). But the federal law makes an exception for “any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.”

California’s policy is different. “The DOJ will permit a person with an out-of-state conviction to acquire or possess a firearm in California only if the conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor, or the person obtained a presidential or governor’s pardon that expressly restores their right to possess firearms,” Donato explains. The requirements for California convictions are similar.

In Jones’ case, the same state that suddenly decided he was not allowed to possess guns employed him as the primary armory officer at the state prison in Solano, where he specialized in “firearms, chemical agents, batons and use of deadly force training,” for nearly two decades. Despite all that experience, the sudden denial of his gun rights put an end to his work as a law enforcement firearms and use-of-force instructor in California. The other two plaintiffs told similar stories of losing their Second Amendment rights based not only on nonviolent offenses that happened long ago but also on convictions that were judicially nullified.

According to the 2018 complaint that Chad Linton filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, he was pulled over by state police in 1987, when he was serving in the U.S. Navy at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island in Washington. The complaint concedes that Linton was “traveling at a high rate of speed” on his motorcycle while “intoxicated” and that he initially “accelerated,” thinking “he might be able to outrun” the cops before he “reconsidered that idea, pulled over to the side of the highway, and voluntarily allowed the state trooper to catch up to him.”

Linton was charged with driving under the influence, a misdemeanor, and attempting to evade a police vehicle, a Class C felony. He pleaded guilty to both charges and received a seven-day sentence, time he had already served. In 1988, he “received a certificate of discharge, showing that he successfully completed his probation.” It “included a statement that ‘the defendant’s civil rights lost by operation of law upon conviction [are] HEREBY RESTORED.'”

Linton, who was born and raised in California, returned there in 1988 after he was discharged from the Navy. He successfully purchased several firearms after passing background checks. But when he tried to buy a handgun in 2015, the DOJ told him he was disqualified because of the 1987 felony conviction. In response, he asked the Superior Court of Washington to vacate that conviction, which it did in April 2016. The order “set aside” the conviction and released Linton “from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense.” But when he tried to buy a rifle in November 2016, he was rejected.

The same thing happened in March 2018, when Linton tried to buy a revolver for home protection. The following month, Donato notes, “DOJ agents came to Linton’s home and seized several firearms from him that he had legally acquired and owned for years, including an ‘antique, family-heirloom shotgun.'”

Although Linton moved to Nevada in 2020, partly because of these experiences, he still owns a cabin in California. He said he felt “unsafe and unprotected” there “without at least the option of having appropriate firearms available or at hand if needed.” He added that he “would like to be able to possess or handle firearms or ammunition for  recreational purposes, such as target shooting,” while visiting friends and relatives in California.

Paul McKinley Stewart’s disqualifying offense dates back even further than Jones’ and Linton’s. In 1976, when he was 18 and living in Arizona, he “stole some tools from an unlocked truck in a commercial yard.” He was found guilty of first-degree burglary, a felony, and served three years of probation, after which he was told that his conviction had been dismissed.

Stewart moved to California in 1988 and tried to buy firearms in 2014 or 2015 (the record is unclear on the exact date). The DOJ “advised him that he was ‘disqualified’ from purchasing or possessing firearms ‘due to the presence of a prior felony conviction.'” Like Linton, Stewart went back to the court of conviction. In August 2016, Donato notes, the Arizona Superior Court “ordered ‘that the civil rights lost at the time of sentencing are now restored,’ ‘set aside [the] judgment of guilt,’ ordered the ‘dismissal of the Information/Indictment,’ and expressly held that the restored rights ‘shall include the right to possess weapons.'” The DOJ nevertheless blocked a gun purchase that Stewart attempted in February 2018, citing the 1976 conviction that officially no longer existed.

Defending these denials in federal court, the state argued that the plaintiffs were not part of “the people” whose “right to keep and bear arms” is guaranteed by the Second Amendment because they were not “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” In California’s view, Donato writes, “a single felony conviction permanently disqualifies an individual from being a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’ within the ambit of the Second Amendment.” He sees “two flaws” that “vitiate this contention.”

First, Donato says, “undisputed facts” establish that all three plaintiffs are “fairly described as law-abiding citizens.” Judging from the fact that “California entrusted Jones with the authority of a sworn peace officer, and with the special role of training other officers in the use of force,” that was the state’s view of him until 2018, when he was peremptorily excluded from “the people.” And as with Jones, there is no indication that the other two plaintiffs have been anything other than “law-abiding” since their youthful offenses. “Linton is a veteran of the United States Navy with a clean criminal record for the past 37 years,” Donato notes. “Stewart has had a clean criminal record for the past 48 years.”

Second, Donato says, California failed to identify any “case law supporting its position.” In the landmark Second Amendment case District of Columbia v. Heller, he notes, the Supreme Court “determined that ‘the people,’ as used throughout the Constitution, ‘unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.'” That holding, he says, creates a “strong presumption” that California failed to rebut.

Donato notes that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit rejected California’s argument in no uncertain terms last year, when it restored the Second Amendment rights of Bryan Range, a Pennsylvania man who had been convicted of misdemeanor food stamp fraud. “Heller and its progeny lead us to conclude that Bryan Range remains among ‘the people’ despite his 1995 false statement conviction,” the 3rd Circuit said. “The Supreme Court’s references to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ do not mean that every American who gets a traffic ticket is no longer among ‘the people’ protected by the Second Amendment.”

Since Jones, Linton, and Stewart are part of “the people,” California had the burden of showing that disarming them was “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation”—the test that the Supreme Court established in the 2022 case New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. “California did not come close to meeting its burden,” Donato writes. It did little more than assert that Americans have Second Amendment rights only if they are “virtuous,” a criterion that is highly contested and in any case would seem to be satisfied by the plaintiffs’ long histories as productive and law-abiding citizens.

“California otherwise presented nothing in the way of historical evidence in support of the conduct challenged here,” Donato says. “It did not identify even one ‘representative analogue’ that could be said to come close to speaking to firearms regulations for individuals in circumstances akin to plaintiffs’. That will not do under Bruen.”

Donato rejected “California’s suggestion that it might have tried harder if the Court had asked.” Under Bruen, “the government bears the burden of proving the element of a national historical tradition,” he writes. “California had every opportunity to present any historical evidence it believed would carry its burden. It chose not to do so.”

Donato was dismayed by the state’s attitude. “The Court is not a helicopter parent,” he writes. “It is manifestly not the Court’s job to poke and prod litigants to live up to their burdens of proof.”

The policy that Jones, Linton, and Stewart challenged seems inconsistent with California’s criminal justice reforms, such as marijuana legalization and the reclassification of many felonies as misdemeanors. It is also inconsistent with the way California treats voting rights, which are automatically restored upon sentence completion. Gun rights in California, by contrast, are easy to lose and hard to recover, even when they have been restored by courts in other states. That disparity seems to reflect the California political establishment’s reflexive hostility to the Second Amendment.

“This case exposes the hypocrisy of California’s treatment of those convicted of non-violent crimes,” says Cody J. Wisniewski, an attorney with the Firearms Policy Coalition, one of several gun rights groups that joined the lawsuit. “While California claims to be tolerant of those that have made mistakes in the past, that tolerance ends when it comes to those individuals [who want] to exercise their right to keep and bear arms. Now, the state has no choice but to recognize the rights of peaceable people.”

SCOTUS heard oral arguments today in the ATF bump stock ban case

SCOTUS Justice Jackson Just Said the Dumbest Thing About Guns and I Can’t Stop Laughing.

Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson must have fallen asleep last night watching a vintage ’80s Chuck Norris movie as part of her preparation to hear oral arguments today in the Garland v. Cargill bumpstock ban lawsuit because her understanding of firearms is even less realistic than your typical Cannon Films production.

While I don’t have the transcript yet for you — arguments are going on as I write this column — the Firearms Policy Coalition has been doing the good work of posting highlights to Twitter/X.

(Don’t miss the update below from the official transcript)

When it was time for the Biden Department of Justice to present its side to the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas asked what happens, according to the FPC, “with the trigger in a bump stocked rifle vs a full-auto rifle.”

Please don’t wet yourself laughing when you read the government’s response.

My 14-year-old self, forever trapped in 1983, would have just one thing to say to a rifle that would let me fire 600 rounds a second: “BITCHIN’!”

Justice Jackson, with images of Chuck Norris killing an entire battalion of Vietnamese soldiers with a single magazine in “Missing in Action 2: The Beginning” still fresh in her mind must have thought, “600 rounds? I raise you 200 rounds to 800 — each and every second.”

ASIDE: Every time I read the words “Justice Jackson” I can’t help but think that’s what Action Jackson went into after he retired from the force.

Anyway, this was Jackson’s contribution to the discussion.

I dunno, maybe she wasn’t paying full attention and misheard the government’s ridiculous claim.

I’m not singling out Justice Jackson for any special mocking here — just the regular amount. Jackson was speaking off the cuff, and everybody makes mistakes doing that. While it’s extra unbecoming for a Justice of the Supreme Court to demonstrate such laughable ignorance about a case she’s supposed to be hearing with her own ears, the government took its time to prepare its case — they wrote stuff down and everything — and still managed to come up with 600 rounds per second.

Some days I wish firearms could do all the things that gun-grabbers claim they can do.

Do I really want an AR-15 that can fire 800 rounds per second? I mean, assuming I could find a magazine with that kind of capacity? No, obviously. The barrel would melt, the bullets would spray all over the place, and I’m having trouble imagining what would happen when 800 brass cartridges go flying out all over the range in a single second.

That one second would also put a serious dent in my .223 stash.

Still… what a glorious second that would be.

UPDATE: SCOTUS did a great job of getting the transcript posted, so I found the relevant bits for you.

MR. FLETCHER: [speaking to Chief Justice Roberts] What you are doing is just pushing forward. Now, if you look at the videos that we cite in Footnote 1 of our reply brief, some of them are in slow motion, and they show that when the shooter is doing this, the hand is moving back and forth very fast, 600 times a second. That’s not happening because the shooter is able to move their hand back and forth 600 — or, I’m sorry, 600 times a minute.

So the Firearms Policy Coalition got the first part right but then missed the correction. Easy to do while essentially liveblogging — I should know. Still, 600 rounds per minute is only slightly less impossible than 600 rounds per second. Even if under some extreme circumstances a bumpstock-enhanced cyborg were able to fire that quickly, a semi-automatic rifle wouldn’t stand up to the strain — and where would the rounds come from?

And here’s Justice Jackson: “And when, you know, ‘function’ is defined, it’s really not about the operation of the thing. It’s about what it can achieve, what it’s being used for. So I see Congress as putting function in this. The function of this trigger is to cause this kind of damage, 800 rounds a second or whatever.”

I think “or whatever” pretty well sums up Jackson’s interest in learning about firearms.

 

NSSF Wins Preliminary Injunction Against California Law Allowing Frivolous Lawsuits Against Gun Industry

A U.S. District Judge has granted an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of California’s law that exposes firearms manufacturers and retailers to lawsuits in the state for lawful commerce in firearms that takes place entirely outside the state of California when those legally made and sold products are misused by criminals and others.

The ruling by Judge Schopler in the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of California enjoined the enforcement of California AB 1594, the so-called “Firearm Industry Responsibility Act.” NSSF sued to challenge the law in June 2023 and moved for an injunction. In granting the injunction, Judge Schopler found the law is likely unconstitutional because it violates the Commerce Clause.

“We are thankful the court enjoined the state from suing members of the firearm industry under this unconstitutional law that attempts to use the real threat of liability on commerce beyond California’s borders and impose its policy choices on its sister states,” stated NSSF Senior Vice President and General Counsel Lawrence G. Keane.

Among other provisions, California AB 1594 bans the manufacture, sale and marketing of firearms the state deems “abnormally dangerous.” It allows civil lawsuits against a firearm industry member to be filed by the Attorney General, any municipality and any person who claims to have suffered harm from the misuse of a legal, lawfully sold firearm by a remote third party. The law unconstitutionally invades the sovereignty of sister states by directly regulating lawful commerce occurring entirely outside the state of California in violation of the Commerce Clause and the United States’ system of federalism. The law also violates the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) enacted by Congress in 2005 to stop just these sorts of frivolous lawsuits against members of the industry.

“We are reviewing the balance of the court’s decision and whether we will file an amended complaint to provide the court more details on how California’s unconstitutional law and its threat of crushing liability is causing real and ongoing harm to members of our industry,” Keane said.

NSSF also claims in its lawsuit that the law also infringes on the Second Amendment and chills First Amendment rights by restricting protected free-speech advertising of Constitutionally-protected products that are lawfully made and sold – even when that advertising takes place outside of California’s borders.

Judge Declares Fargo’s Ban on Home-Based Gun Businesses Goes Too Far

For several years the city of Fargo, North Dakota has prohibited FFL’s from operating out of their homes, but the state legislature took aim at that restriction last year and passed a law that bans localities from establishing zoning ordinances that specifically include firearms and ammunition based businesses.

The city almost immediately filed suit challenging the law, but this week state District Judge Cherie Clark ruled against Fargo; tossing out the city’s lawsuit and rejecting its argument that the zoning preemption law violates the state constitution and the home rule powers granted to local authorities.

“While the Court agrees that (the North Dakota Constitution) intends for ‘maximum local self-government,’ the law is not settled that this language alone provides home rule cities the right to legislate on topics the state legislature has limited,” the judge wrote.

But she also expressed concerns about the Legislature’s actions: “If the legislature continues to pare home rule powers, home rule cities lack the discretion to address important issues impacting their respective and unique communities.”

What, exactly, is so unique about Fargo that federal firearms licensees shouldn’t be allowed to operate a home-based business? The city has never offered a good explanation, instead blithely asserting that it “does not want its residents to utilize their homes in residential areas as gun stores.”

Well, tough. There’s no prohibition in either state or federal law that precludes home-based FFLs, and it doesn’t appear that any other locality in the state has tried to erect any similar barriers, so why should FFLs in Fargo be punished or forced to spend money on a brick-and-mortar location, especially if they’re selling guns on a part-time basis?

This is actually the second law that the state legislature has adopted to deal with Fargo’s restrictions, but the city was successful in defending its ordinance in 2021, which led lawmakers to try again last year.

Bill sponsor and Republican state Rep. Ben Koppelman told a state Senate panel in April that the issue came to greater attention in 2016 when, because of the ordinance, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives refused to renew the federal firearms licenses of Fargo dealers who sold out of their homes.

“What is at issue is whether we want local governments creating gun control or whether we want gun regulations to remain a state-controlled issue,” Koppelman said in April. “Without this bill and in light of the (2021) court opinion, I think local political subdivisions could propose all sorts of local gun control, and based on the anti-gun track record of the City of Fargo Commission, I think we could expect it.”

Both sides in the lawsuit agree that the issue at hand goes beyond the zoning laws in question, and instead touches on the ability of home-rule localities to pass their own laws in any number of areas. But even though the North Dakota Constitution compelled the state legislature to come up with a home-rule statute and lawmakers granted home-rule communities the authority to adopt ordinances, resolutions, and regulations that provide for public health, safety, morals, and welfare, it’s still within the state’s authority to declare certain subjects off-limits to local control.

Three years ago the legislature adopted a preemption law stating:

1. A political subdivision, including home rule cities or counties, may not enact a zoning ordinance or any other ordinance relating to the purchase, sale, ownership, possession,transfer of ownership, registration, or licensure of firearms and ammunition which is more restrictive than state law. All such existing ordinances are void.

A state judge ruled that Fargo’s home-based FFL zoning prohibition could still be enforced because the state had no regulations concerning commercial firearms sales. While most of us would conclude that any zoning ordinance would be more restrictive than a state law that doesn’t exist, District Judge Stephannie Nicole Stiel sided with Fargo’s argument that the ordinance in question wasn’t more restrictive than state law because state statutes were silent on commercial gun sales sales.

That’s not the case these days, thanks to the legislature’s response last year, and Judge Clark made the right call, even though her editorializing on the legislature’s actions was completely unnecessary. Fargo officials could still appeal Clark’s decision, but the odds of success are pretty long, and it would be a waste of time and taxpayer money to try to keep this needless ordinance in place instead of accepting home-based FFLs and the tax revenue they generate.

The Honorable Judge Benitez strikes again.

The state court mistakenly did not regard the pistol or the billy to be the sorts of arms protected by the Second Amendment. Instead, only weapons of war were covered by the Constitution, according to Workman. As to other kinds of arms, Workman incorrectly observed,

in regard to the kind of arms referred to in the [Second] amendment, it must be held to refer to the weapons of warfare to be used by the militia, such as swords, guns, rifles, and muskets,—arms to be used in defending the State and civil liberty,—and not to pistols, bowie-knife, brass knuckles, billies, and such other weapons . . . .

In short, Workman held that weapons of war are protected by the Second Amendment but found weapons like the billy are not weapons of war, and therefore are not protected.

Workman was wrong in concluding the Second Amendment does not cover arms like the pistol and the billy.…

The Second Amendment protects a citizen’s right to defend one’s self with dangerous and lethal firearms. But not everybody wants to carry a firearm for self defense. Some prefer less-lethal weapons. A billy is a less-lethal weapon that may be used for self-defense.

It is a simple weapon that most anybody between the ages of eight and eighty can fashion from a wooden stick, or a clothes pole, or a dowel rod. One can easily imagine countless citizens carrying these weapons on daily walks and hikes to defend themselves against attacks by humans or animals. To give full life to the core right of self-defense, every law-abiding responsible individual citizen has a constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms like the billy for lawful purposes.

gov.uscourts.casd.644922.86.0

NRA Loses Corruption Case, LaPierre Liable for Millions

Manhattan, New York — The National Rifle Association failed to safeguard its donor’s funds while Wayne LaPierre diverted millions toward lavish personal expenses.

That’s the finding a six-person jury handed down on Friday after a week of deliberations. They sided with New York Attorney General Letitia James (D.) against the NRA and its leadership. In addition to the group and its former CEO Lapierre, the jury also ruled against former Treasurer Woody Phillips and General Counsel John Frazer.

The six-member jury in the civil case found LaPierre did $5.4 million worth of harm to the NRA by using its charitable funds to pay for things like private jet travel. They determined he’d already paid back about a million dollars of that harm, but also that there was enough evidence to bar him from being the group’s CEO in the future.

They found Phillips had violated his duty to work in good faith for the NRA, and that his briefly-lived post-employment contract was an unauthorized related-party transaction. However, they found it didn’t do any monetary harm to the organization. Similarly, the jurors found Frazer had violated his duty to the group and authorized “materially false” statements the NRA made on a government disclosure about related party transactions, but they also found his actions didn’t cause the group monetary harm and there wasn’t cause to remove him.

The jury also found a series of payments made to board members or people related to NRA employees were not properly approved ahead of time, but all but two–hair and makeup for Wayne LaPierre’s wife and speaking fees for former NRA president David Keene–were properly approved after the fact. However, they also found the NRA did not have a proper whistle-blower policy for years and did nothing to prevent retaliation against eight whistle-blowers identified in the case.

Judge Joel Cohen is now tasked with deciding what remedies are appropriate for the damages the jury has identified. What he decides will determine the future of the nation’s largest gun-rights group. In addition to barring LaPierre from working with the NRA or other non-profits, he could force the former CEO to pay the organization back for expenses the jury found were unlawful. But he could also appoint a monitor to oversee the NRA’s operations, which might completely transform the group’s leadership and internal operations.

A significant overhaul of the most prominent gun group in America will have a substantial impact on gun politics throughout the nation, especially since it’s far from clear the group can recover.

Of course, the corruption allegations and legal ordeal have already made a tremendous mark on the NRA. Since news of the illicit spending broke in 2018, the group has experienced an unprecedented exodus of members. Millions of people have abandoned the organization, with nobody quite sure how many remain. That’s led directly to a funding shortfall that has forced the group to slash spending on key programs, such as gun safety training and political campaigns, while pouring an unprecedented amount into controversial legal bills.

The group has continued to see declines in fundraising and will likely only be a shadow of its former self in the upcoming 2024 presidential election.

LaPierre, who resigned in the middle of the trial, and the NRA have argued that downfall was AG James’s goal from the beginning. They noted she had promised to investigate the group during her campaign, which she said wasn’t a charity but a “terrorist organization.” Her initial complaint sought the total shutdown of the NRA.

“The fact is, Letitia James set out to destroy the NRA, and the best way to do that was to destroy Wayne LaPierre,” P. Kent Correll, who represents the former CEO, said in closing arguments.

However, Judge Cohen and an appellate court rejected the argument that the case was solely a political attack when the NRA sought to have it dismissed. However, Judge Cohen also removed dissolution as a potential remedy because he argued it would be detrimental to NRA members–the people James is tasked with protecting in the suit.

“In short, the Complaint does not allege the type of public harm that is the legal linchpin for imposing the ‘corporate death penalty,’” he wrote in his opinion. “Moreover, dissolving the NRA could impinge, at least indirectly, on the free speech and assembly rights of its millions of members.”

But he let the case proceed because the allegations “tell a grim story of greed, self-dealing, and lax financial oversight at the highest levels of the National Rifle Association.”

In addition to the argument about James’s political motivations, the NRA focused much of its defense on the claim it had already instituted enough reforms to self-correct. It argued that many of the illicit expenses at issue in the case did happen, but the NRA had since fired some of those involved and established internal controls to address the problems. It also attacked as unreliable former insiders, including board members and executives, who testified against those claims in court.

“The NRA Board of Directors, which is the seat of the NRA’s corporate governance, acted in good faith and with ordinary care,” the NRA’s lawyer argued.

“Ladies and gentlemen, when you’re caught in the act, saying you’re sorry now, saying that you’ll do better, doesn’t mean you didn’t take the cookie,” the AG’s lawyer responded.

As has been the case with some current NRA insiders, the group’s current leadership failed to convince the jury they resolved the issues.

Neither the NRA nor the AG responded to requests for comment.

Judge Cohen will now schedule the next trial phase, where he will be responsible for determining the final settlement of the case.

Jury finds NRA and ex-CEO Wayne LaPierre liable in civil corruption trial

The jurors determined there was cause to remove LaPierre and that he owes the organization nearly $4 million.

Former National Rifle Association CEO Wayne LaPierre has been ordered to pay nearly $4 million to the nonprofit after a jury on Friday found him liable in a civil corruption trial brought by New York Attorney General Letitia James.

The defendants, which included the NRA itself, the organization’s general counsel and corporate secretary John Frazer and former treasurer and chief financial officer Wilson “Woody” Phillips, were accused of using the nonprofit as a “personal piggy bank” in a civil lawsuit filed by James in 2020. James alleged that they violated nonprofit laws and misused tens of millions in NRA funds for personal gain.

After a week of deliberation, the jury agreed that the attorney general had proved her case, finding each of the defendants liable for violating their statutory obligations. The jury determined that LaPierre cost the organization more than $5 million but had already repaid $1.4 million. Phillips was held to have harmed the group to the tune of $2 million; the jury did not put a dollar amount on Frazer’s violation.

In their argument, attorneys for the NRA had sought to distance the organization from LaPierre, who announced his resignation as CEO just days before the trial began in January, after more than 30 years at the helm. Sarah Rogers, representing the organization, said in opening arguments that LaPierre, though a “valuable and visionary leader, was “not always a meticulous corporate executive” and questioned why the NRA was even a defendant in the case.

LaPierre’s attorneys, however, maintained that he used private jets not for personal gain, but to raise funds for the organization and for gun rights causes — even as LaPierre himself testified that he improperly expensed private flights and failed to disclose accepting luxury vacations from vendors.

“He was a visionary,” his lawyer P. Kent Correll said in closing arguments on Thursday. “He was a genius.”

NY vs. NRA: Statement by Former BOD Timothy Knight

The verdict in the NY vs. NRA case is due shortly.

Although I believe the case had some political motivations behind it based on the words of the New York Attorney General when she was running for office, I don’t think NRA members should dismiss the grave concerns revealed in what is now several court cases.

I, along with a few other directors, expressed concerns over the misappropriation of funds both internally and then later publicly in 2019.

We recognized who our boss actually was: our fellow members who were faithfully paying their dues.

We did not believe the NRA Board and management were holding to the mission of the Association, nor were they being transparent about expenses. Every NRA Director has a duty to the members, the law, and the NRA’s mission statement. Several of us were dismissed from our committees and accused of disloyalty towards the NRA for raising our financial concerns. Most Board members were too scared to stand up to Wayne and his cronies, especially Marion Hammer. Other Board members were part of the management cabal themselves and had no intention of changing a thing. So, the Board circled their wagons and remained silent. They were unwilling or unable to speak up or divided on where their loyalties lay.

The current NRA Board has failed in its duty to the NRA members, and I think that every single Board member who hasn’t openly spoken up about reform and responsibility should resign immediately.

Our Association deserves bold, honorable, and honest Board members focused on their legal responsibilities and on the members who elected them. No more should they focus on those who can dole out favors, vacations, car rides, consulting fees, and other grafts. We need to stop electing the silent, the complicit, or those who hope to be “trusted remainders” when this all blows over. Board members who are 2nd Amendment heroes, politicians, or captains of industry might once have been effective for our association. They are no longer effective and need to resign as well.

To fix our association, we need a much smaller board with term limits as well as a significant revision of the structure the board operates under. Strict disclosure rules for Board members and management need to be enforced and shared with NRA members during the annual meeting. This information should be disclosed to everyone during the main members’ business meeting, which is open to the public.

I trust the members who make up the association and in the mission statement that should always keep it focused. We need new leadership and a new board now. If both do not change, the slow degradation of our once great association will do more damage to our civil rights, hunting culture, gun safety education, and competitions that we can ill afford. My fellow members, if the court does not grant you the remedy you think is deserved, please stop supporting the do nothing, ne’er do wells, and the faded heroes.

I look forward to the day when the NRA, once again, through hard work and results, regains the trust of millions of law-abiding gun owners. We are stronger when we stand together as hunters, competitors, enthusiasts, advocates, and educators.

Timothy Knight
NRA Board of Directors 2015-2019