{"id":107941,"date":"2025-02-28T08:02:10","date_gmt":"2025-02-28T14:02:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/?p=107941"},"modified":"2025-02-28T08:02:10","modified_gmt":"2025-02-28T14:02:10","slug":"107941","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/?p=107941","title":{"rendered":""},"content":{"rendered":"

The Fall of the USS Gettysburg.<\/a><\/p>\n

“Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.”<\/em><\/p>\n

At around 0300, on Sunday, 22 December, the Aegis cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64) shot down an F\/A-18F preparing to land on USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) while operating in the Red Sea.\u00a0 The Carrier Strike Group to which each of these units was assigned was an element of the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, assigned to protect Red Sea merchant traffic from Yemen-based Houthi attacks.<\/p>\n

First, we all need to understand that there is only one man who knows what happened on that day, and that is the commanding officer of Gettysburg.\u00a0 Apart from the F\/A-18F crew, which possesses a very small but critical piece of the puzzle, everyone else is just an observer, a post-exercise armchair quarterback.\u00a0 Having said that, while Gettysburg\u2019s captain knows what happened in terms of the detailed, incredibly complex sequence of events, unless the failure was the result of discrete, identifiable human error, he may not, in the immediate aftermath, understand\u00a0why<\/em>\u00a0certain things did happen. For example, if systems or off-ship persons failed to operate as advertised, he wouldn\u2019t know exactly why those systems or persons failed. That level of detail may only be revealed in the post-mortem.<\/p>\n

Slowly, those pieces are being put together, and each day more is understood as to what happened. That is a good thing, because this was a combat-level laboratory, in which strengths and weaknesses were on real-world display.\u00a0 This was a night which should be closely studied, and learned from, against future nights in which the missiles are flying.<\/p>\n

Here\u2019s the problem: By the time that the Navy, writ large, understands all the errors and failures that contributed to this particular chain of events, a standard strategy may well have been enacted, i.e., \u201cNothing to see here, folks.\u00a0 Move along.\u201d \u00a0You see, the Navy doesn\u2019t like to discuss \u201cfamily business\u201d with taxpayers, who may ask awkward, and potentially embarrassing, questions. It is much easier to pin the tail on one specific, commanding officer donkey.<\/p>\n

During the first decade of this century, the commanding officer a ship was referred to, by the staff of Commander Naval Surface Forces, as \u201cthe sacrificial captain,\u201d and for good reason.\u00a0 Holding one person up to the public, as the single point of failure in any specific disaster, forestalls further, probing questions that often don\u2019t have easy answers.<\/p>\n

In the end, this may mean that larger systemic issues remain unresolved. Rather, blame is often placed at the door of the ship in question, and everyone else who might have been, in one way or another, complicit, simply moves out of the blast pattern until it\u2019s safe to go back to exactly what they were doing before.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Based upon information from people who know and understand specific parts of the overall equation, I believe what transpired that night is significantly more complex than the idea that the ship simply made a mistake.<\/p>\n

It appears that this is what happened:\u00a0 There was an \u201cAir Warning Red\u201d environment in the Red Sea, that night. This means that the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group was under attack.\u00a0\u00a0 In fact, in the hour proceeding the engagement in question, the strike group had countered one-way attack (OWA) UAVs and cruise missile threats.\u00a0 In such a scenario, the defending ships \u2013 in this case, led by Gettysburg \u2013 are charged to kill anything \u201cnot positively identified as friendly.\u201d<\/p>\n

This of course, begs the question as to how you identify an airborne object as \u201cfriendly.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 Without wading into the esoteric, there is one method that most commonly serves as the final arbiter of a friendliness; and that is \u201cMode V\u201d IFF, or Identification Friend or Foe.\u00a0\u00a0 It is not the only method, but it is the final, pre-engagement gate though which a ship must pass before undertaking an engagement. Mode V is an encoded piece of IFF query that only friendly units can respond to. In fact, the missile system in Gettysburg will not allow the ship to shoot a target with \u201cPositive Mode V.\u201d\u00a0 And the challenge is\u00a0automatically<\/em>\u00a0initiated before any missile shot.<\/p>\n

In other words, if the challenge is automatically initiated, and if Gettysburg could not fire if a positive response was received from the potential target, and if F\/A-18F\u2019s are equipped with Mode V – which they are – what failed on that day?<\/p>\n

It now appears that the accident was caused by a combination of human and computer errors. As far as human error, much does fall on the shoulders of Gettysburg.\u00a0 If the ship had followed its own procedures properly, despite the other issues which arose, the engagement might have been averted.\u00a0 In the effort to identify aircraft as either hostile, neutral, or friendly, there is a complex, multi-watch station effort that takes place on a ship.\u00a0 On that night, while not all Mode V messages were arriving in the ship, at least one operator did get a positive response from the soon-to-be engaged aircraft.\u00a0 However, the ship then went to flight quarters. When a cruiser goes to flight quarters to either launch or recover a helicopter, a large segment of the ship\u2019s radar is shut down to prevent harming the ship\u2019s helicopter.\u00a0\u00a0 Then, once flight operations were concluded, and the F\/A-18F was redetected, it was mistakenly identified as a \u201cVampire,\u201d or incoming hostile missile. That operator could have stopped the engagement. Why didn\u2019t he?<\/p>\n

In another case, a Gettysburg operator was able to identify the jet, based upon its radar emissions.\u00a0 It appears that he reported this via push button action, rather than voice.\u00a0\u00a0 His report got hung up in the computer system, which has been a known electronic warfare problem in NAVSEA \u2013 the provider of computer systems to ships – since 2021.\u00a0 Still, if the operator had asserted his knowledge, via voice, to the commanding officer and Tactical Action Officer (TAO) disaster might have been averted.<\/p>\n

There was another system onboard Gettysburg that day.\u00a0\u00a0 A system which more than backs up the standard Combat Systems computer networks.\u00a0\u00a0 This system is called the Cooperative Engagement System, or \u201cCEC.\u201d That system would have known the exact identity of the F\/A-18F in question, and independently of any other system.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 On that night, CEC was down.\u00a0\u00a0 If it had been working, the chance for a \u201cblue-on-blue\u201d engagement would have been erased.\u00a0 Unfortunately, and even though they knew that this critical system was inoperative, the ship failed to report this casualty.<\/p>\n

If you\u2019re the captain, you bear ultimate responsibility. This has always been the code.\u00a0 This is the way we like it. As far as the ship\u2019s captain, his change of command took place prior to the release of the still-in-progress investigation.\u00a0 He was not fired, but you may rest assured that his career is over.\u00a0\u00a0 Still, the fact that he was not \u201crelieved-for cause,\u201d suggests that the responsibility for this event spreads far beyond USS Gettysburg.<\/p>\n

As far as off-ship errors contributing to the engagement, there is much to see. The F\/A-18F is equipped with a system called \u201cLink-16.\u201d \u00a0The aircraft doesn\u2019t just communicate with the fleet by voice.\u00a0 Rather, information flows automatically, via computer link, to and from every fleet unit where it is displayed on a screen for operators to use.\u00a0 The aircraft doesn\u2019t even need to speak.\u00a0 There is an element of Link-16 called \u201cPPLI\u201d or Precise Participant Location and Identification.\u00a0 PPLI is a Link 16 \u201cmessage\u201d that is used by every Link-16 equipped unit, including the F\/A-18F, to transmit complete location, identification, and limited status in formation.<\/p>\n

On that day, at the time of engagement, it was reported that the aircraft engaged was not transmitting on Link-16.<\/p>\n

There are other questions which have yet to be answered: Beyond Link 16 and IFF, why wasn\u2019t the pilot of the F\/A-18F in voice communication with either \u201cRedcrown,\u201d (the unit responsible for effective identification and tracking of all aircraft anticipated to enter the airspace during combat) or the E-2 aircraft which performs overwatch of the entire airborne picture? \u00a0If the aircraft was on final approach to the aircraft carrier, and had \u201cswitched\u201d to specific landing communications, how was its friendly identity completely lost to the force during that approach?<\/p>\n

Why is it inevitably difficult to get aviators to comply with min-go, comms, and RTF (Return to Force) procedures?<\/p>\n

Further, all warfare commanders report to \u201cAlfa Bravo.\u201d\u00a0 AB represents the strike group commander.\u00a0 They exercise \u201ccommand by negation.\u201d\u00a0 They watch the battle, and they have the absolute authority to alter any action by a subordinate commander, like \u201cAlfa Whiskey,\u201d the Air Warfare Commander (USS Gettysburg).\u00a0 Where was Bravo in all of this?\u00a0 Either the admiral in charge of the strike group, or his appointed \u201cbattle watch captain\u201d could have stopped the engagement with a word.\u00a0 They didn\u2019t. Why?<\/p>\n

Moreover, there were people on the carrier who knew, all along, that the F-18 was friendly.\u00a0 At least one person broadcast on the air defense radio circuit that the jet was a friend, but neither was she persistent, nor was she forceful enough to penetrate the noise in those final moments.<\/p>\n

Beyond human error, there were major problems with computer systems that night.<\/p>\n

As it turns out, ships are dependent upon the most sophisticated systems, all of which are driven by complex and interconnected computer programs, each of which arrives in the ship with the expectation that they work as advertised.\u00a0 Again, without too much arcana, the computer system that connects with the IFF system is called the Command and Decision Subsystem of the Aegis Weapons System, or simply \u201cC&D.\u201d\u00a0 The C&D program that was delivered to Gettysburg \u2013 the C&D running the IFF system – was delivered to the ship with multiple faults.\u00a0 These faults were not disclosed to the ship. The fact is that no program delivered to any ship is ever \u201cperfect.\u201d There are inevitably multiple faults which are intended to be corrected in the next program iteration.\u00a0 These programs are delivered on a schedule, and NAVSEA \u2013 the Navy\u2019s \u201cengineer\u201d – determines which faults are so critical that they must be fixed prior to delivery. Again, the ship never knows what these faults are.<\/p>\n

Generally, that\u2019s acceptable for several reasons. First, the faults allowed are inevitably trivial. Second, the cost of program perfection in terms of dollars and schedule frequently outweighs the benefit.\u00a0 Third, it\u2019s not as if the ship\u2019s operators would necessarily understand some of these very obscure, very minor issues.<\/p>\n

Problematically, it now appears that the C&D program delivered to Gettysburg was rushed to the point of being forced, and it had more significant issues \u2013 issues that impacted the engagement in question.\u00a0 Major issues about which the ship was uninformed.<\/p>\n

As far as the C&D system employed by Gettysburg that night, there were three faults that contributed to the disaster. Faults which the ship knew nothing about, because they were not told.\u00a0 Three types of messages were persistently \u201chung up\u201d in the C&D system:\u00a0 PPLI messages, Electronic Warfare Messages, and Mode V IFF messages.\u00a0 Not in every case, but on that night, the holes of the Swiss cheese aligned in such a way that the F\/A-18F engagement was inevitable.<\/p>\n

Going even deeper – and this is perhaps more concerning in the long run – USS Gettysburg completed all the pre-deployment training required for a ship to be certified to deploy.\u00a0 However, the ship had performed at what would have been, as recently as the first decade of this century, a failure-level.\u00a0 Indeed, Gettysburg\u2019s substandard performance continues to be a matter of jest in the strike group to which Gettysburg belongs \u2013 the strike group responsible for certifying the ship as ready for deployment, and assignment to the Truman Strike Group.\u00a0\u00a0 Indeed, the training performance of the entire strike group appears to have been sub-standard, and not just Gettysburg.<\/p>\n

How does this happen?\u00a0 Why would we send a ship or a strike group to a war zone if they aren\u2019t deemed to perform at an acceptable level?<\/p>\n

The fact is that there are too few ships of the type and capability of Gettysburg.\u00a0 That fact is that there are too few aircraft carrier to meet the unquenchable demand of the military\u2019s Combatant Commands. Everyone wants aircraft carrier strike groups in their neck of the woods, and the fact that the Navy is steadily decreasing in size, is not the Combatant Commander\u2019s problem.\u00a0 It is incumbent upon the Navy to say, \u201cno.\u201d\u00a0 Yet, the Navy does not say no.\u00a0 The Navy is determined to pull its own weight and respond to the demand signal.\u00a0 The result is that the Navy will not say, \u201clet\u2019s take a pause here.\u00a0 This ship isn\u2019t quite ready, and she needs more work.\u00a0 We will fill the gap with another, more ready ship.\u201d\u00a0 There simply are not enough ships \u2013 and certainly not enough Aegis cruisers and aircraft carriers \u2013 to allow for this.\u00a0 Instead, the ship is certified.<\/p>\n

Of course, this is a different Navy, today, and as is the case with the shortage of cruiser and aircraft carriers, this is a larger issue and one which should concern us all in any future conflict.\u00a0\u00a0 In the past, operators went to long schools to be able to fix systems when the ship is deployed, and especially, if the ship needs those systems in combat.\u00a0\u00a0 Not today.\u00a0 Schools are expensive, and the Navy has opted for \u201cblack box\u201d systems, in which the operators just try to effect repairs without much understanding what exactly is wrong.\u00a0 Just replace the old, potentially broken parts, until you find the answer.\u00a0\u00a0 Then, if you can\u2019t find the answer, someone ashore, thousands of miles away, may help you \u2013 if they can \u2013 because after all, they\u2019re not there in the ship.\u00a0\u00a0 If they can\u2019t help, eventually, someone who knows how to fix the system may arrive on your ship, but that may take weeks.<\/p>\n

There is a saying that goes “Success has many fathers but failure is an orphan.” Or, in this case, an only child; the USS Gettysburg. Without the desire to sacrifice a man and move on; without the pointing of fingers; despite the mess involved, and the potential need to implement deep changes, the Navy should ask the hard questions.\u00a0 What really happened and why?\u00a0 We supposedly learned this when USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS McCain (DDG 56) experienced major collisions. In both cases, it was determined that responsibility lay not only in the ships themselves, but far beyond and up the chain of Navy command.<\/p>\n

\n

Kevin Eyer<\/strong>\u00a0is a retired Navy Captain who commanded three Aegis cruisers.\u00a0 He was also the USNI Author of the Year in 2017.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Fall of the USS Gettysburg. “Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.” At around 0300, on Sunday, 22 December, the Aegis cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64) shot down an F\/A-18F preparing to land on USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) while operating in the Red Sea.\u00a0 The Carrier Strike Group to which each … Continue reading “”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,101],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-107941","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-military","category-stupid-o-the-day"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107941","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=107941"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107941\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":107942,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107941\/revisions\/107942"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=107941"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=107941"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=107941"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}