{"id":118167,"date":"2026-08-07T11:18:57","date_gmt":"2026-08-07T16:18:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/?p=118167"},"modified":"2026-08-07T11:19:08","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T16:19:08","slug":"118167","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/?p=118167","title":{"rendered":""},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/2026\/08\/what-is-trapped-in-amber-an-originalist-explanation\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">What is \u201ctrapped in amber\u201d?An originalist explanation<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Anyone watching the Supreme Court this past term may have remarked on the frequency with which the justices talk about fossilized tree resin. Consider:<\/p>\n<ul class=\"my-4 list-disc list-outside pl-[1.5em] marker:text-ruby-500\">\n<li class=\"mb-1 pl-[0.375em]\">The court in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/25pdf\/25a312_5468.pdf\"><em>Trump v. Cook<\/em><\/a>: \u201cWe see no reason, however, why our central bank ought to be \u2018trapped in amber\u2019 any more than any other aspect of our constitutional scheme.\u201d<\/li>\n<li class=\"mb-1 pl-[0.375em]\">The court in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/25pdf\/24-1260_g3cn.pdf\"><em>Watson v. Republican National Committee<\/em><\/a>: \u201cStatutes do not \u2018tra[p] in amber\u2019 every contemporary practice on the same subject matter.\u201d<\/li>\n<li class=\"mb-1 pl-[0.375em]\">Justice Sonia Sotomayor in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/25pdf\/24-856_kjfm.pdf\"><em>Cisco Systems v. Doe I<\/em><\/a>: \u201cThere also is no indication that Congress intended to \u2018tra[p]\u2019 the [Alien Tort Statute] \u2018in amber.\u2019\u201d<\/li>\n<li class=\"mb-1 pl-[0.375em]\">Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/25pdf\/24-1046_nmio.pdf\"><em>Wolford v. Lopez<\/em><\/a>: \u201cSuch a narrow search results in a \u2018law trapped in amber.\u2019\u201d<\/li>\n<li class=\"mb-1 pl-[0.375em]\">Sotomayor in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/25pdf\/25-332_qn12.pdf\"><em>Trump v. Slaughter<\/em><\/a>: \u201cWhen, exactly is our law \u2018trapped in amber,\u2019 and when is it not?\u201d<\/li>\n<li class=\"mb-1 pl-[0.375em]\">Justice Brett Kavanaugh in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/25pdf\/25-365_4hdj.pdf\"><em>Trump v. Barbara<\/em><\/a>: \u201cThis Court\u2019s constitutional precedents do not treat the 1791 or 1868 exceptions as a closed set \u2018trapped in amber.\u2019\u201d<\/li>\n<li class=\"mb-1 pl-[0.375em]\">Justice Amy Coney Barrett at oral argument in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/oral_arguments\/argument_transcripts\/2025\/24-1234_h31i.pdf\"><em>United States v. Hemani<\/em><\/a>: \u201cI agree with you that you don\u2019t need to have just alcohol because that\u2019s all there was at the founding and that would be trapped in amber.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The expression has become increasingly popular in the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/assets.nationbuilder.com\/firearmspolicycoalition\/pages\/6504\/attachments\/original\/1784307428\/2026.07.17_125_OPINION.pdf?1784307428\">lower<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/cases.justia.com\/federal\/appellate-courts\/ca4\/24-1493\/24-1493-2025-08-01.pdf?ts=1754074877\">courts<\/a>, too. Earlier this week, law professor Richard Re\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/2026\/08\/a-court-trapped-in-amber\/\">traced<\/a>\u00a0the history of the metaphor and its rapid spread over the past two years.<\/p>\n<p>As Re correctly recognizes, though early uses of the phrase evoked a living Constitution \u2013 one whose meaning evolves over time \u2013 each of the references collected above traces back to a line in the Supreme Court\u2019s originalist decision in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/cases\/united-states-v-rahimi\/\"><em>United States v. Rahimi<\/em><\/a>, in which the court upheld a federal law that disarms those under a domestic violence restraining order. There, the court used the phrase to clarify that its Second Amendment precedents \u201cwere not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.\u201d The court\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/23pdf\/22-915_8o6b.pdf\">continued<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"my-6 border-l-2 border-navy-500 pl-4 italic\"><p><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>[T]he reach of the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms that were in existence at the founding. Rather, it \u201cextends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in existence.\u201d By that same logic, the Second Amendment permits more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would be as mistaken as applying the protections of the right only to muskets and sabers.<\/strong><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>At the time, professor Josh Blackman\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/reason.com\/volokh\/2024\/06\/25\/is-law-trapped-in-amber\/\">predicted<\/a>\u00a0that the \u201camber\u201d line would become \u201cthe most quoted sentence\u201d in the opinion, and a way for judges to escape the original meaning of the law. I\u2019ll leave the citation counts to more empirically inclined court-watchers, but the evidence Re collects vindicates Blackman\u2019s prediction to this extent: the metaphor has become a flashpoint in the contest over what it means to do originalism.<\/p>\n<p>Properly understood, originalism indeed holds that law is fixed \u2013 &#8220;trapped in amber,\u201d if you will. But the circumstances to which it applies are not.<strong> The problem with the amber metaphor is that courts increasingly use it without distinguishing law from its application.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p><strong>Originalism and amber<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>As Barrett explained in her\u00a0<em>Rahimi\u00a0<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/23pdf\/22-915_8o6b.pdf#page=60\">concurrence<\/a>, originalism \u201cis built on two core principles: that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at the time of its ratification and that the \u2018discoverable historical meaning \u2026 has legal significance and is authoritative in most circumstances.\u2019\u201d For short,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/legaltheorylexicon.com\/2004\/01\/legal_theory_le_1-12\/\">scholars<\/a>\u00a0refer to these commitments as the \u201cfixation thesis\u201d and the \u201cconstraint principle.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The fixation thesis means that\u00a0<em>something\u00a0<\/em>gets \u201ctrapped in amber\u201d at the time a law is promulgated, and the constraint principle means that judges are bound to adhere to whatever that\u00a0<em>something\u00a0<\/em>is today. Justice Neil Gorsuch made this point in his\u00a0<em>Rahimi\u00a0<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/23pdf\/22-915_8o6b.pdf#page=29\">concurrence<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"my-6 border-l-2 border-navy-500 pl-4 italic\"><p>When the people ratified the Second Amendment, they surely understood an arms-bearing citizenry posed some risks. But just as surely they believed that the right protected by the Second Amendment was itself vital to the preservation of life and liberty. We have no authority to question that judgment. As judges charged with respecting the people\u2019s directions in the Constitution\u2014directions that are \u201ctrapped in amber\u201d\u2014our only lawful role is to apply them in the cases that come before us.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nevertheless, we have repeated assurances in purportedly originalist opinions that this or that is\u00a0<em>not\u00a0<\/em>\u201ctrapped in amber.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>What, then, does originalism say is trapped in amber? Gorsuch calls it \u201cthe people\u2019s directions in the Constitution.\u201d Barrett calls it \u201cmeaning\u201d with \u201clegal significance.\u201d We might, for brevity\u2019s sake, call it \u201claw.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This makes the phrasing in\u00a0<em>Rahimi\u00a0<\/em>infelicitous: \u201cThese [originalist] precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.\u201d Professor Re translates the line: \u201cthe Supreme Court denied that the Second Amendment is \u2018a law trapped in amber.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The problem is, Second Amendment precedents\u00a0<em>do\u00a0<\/em>\u201csuggest a law trapped in amber.\u201d In\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/cases\/dc-v-heller\/\"><em>District of Columbia v. Heller<\/em><\/a>, for example, the court explained that \u201c[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>What is\u00a0<em>not\u00a0<\/em>\u201ctrapped in amber\u201d is law\u2019s\u00a0<em>application\u00a0<\/em>in future circumstances. Here is how the court made the point in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/cases\/new-york-state-rifle-pistol-association-inc-v-bruen\/\"><em>New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass\u2019n v. Bruen<\/em><\/a>: \u201cAlthough its meaning is fixed according to the understandings of those who ratified it, the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated.\u201d The court goes on, as it did in\u00a0<em>Rahimi<\/em>, to note that the Second Amendment protects \u201cmodern instruments that facilitate armed self-defense,\u201d even if such instruments did not exist at the time of ratification.<\/p>\n<p>In short, to an originalist, the law is trapped in amber; its application is not. (For a deeper discussion of this distinction, see\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/2025\/11\/what-james-madison-thought-about-ar-15s\/\">this column<\/a>\u00a0from last year.)<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Second Amendment and amber<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Why, then, does\u00a0<em>Rahimi<\/em>\u00a0deny that \u201claw\u201d is \u201ctrapped in amber\u201d? It has to do with the way the Second Amendment operates: as a limit on governments\u2019 regulatory authority. And just as it applies to new firearms, it also applies to new assertions of regulatory authority.<\/p>\n<p><em>Rahimi<\/em>\u00a0does not deny that the law created by the Second Amendment is fixed. But the body of firearm law (comprised of statutes, ordinances, and common-law principles) on which it operates is not. Legislatures change that body of law for any number of reasons: political, social, economic, technological. The\u00a0<em>rules\u00a0<\/em>about which types of regulatory measures are permissible and which are not remain constant, but the body of statutes and regulations to which they apply is not. It is the latter body of law that is not \u201ctrapped in amber.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The amber admonition must have seemed particularly important to the\u00a0<em>Rahimi\u00a0<\/em>court because the text of the Second Amendment does not describe all the contours of the right it codifies. That right \u201cis not unlimited,\u201d but the Second Amendment does not state what those limits are. Rather, we must infer them by looking to the \u201chistorical tradition of firearm regulation\u201d that coexisted with the right from the start. When one must look to the laws the Second Amendment permits to determine\u00a0<em>what\u00a0<\/em>the Second Amendment permits, there is some risk of mistaking original applications for original law.<\/p>\n<p>But dangers lie in the other direction, too. A judge wishing to escape the narrowness of the original factual conditions to which a law applied may loosen the law itself, rejecting the rule it establishes for broad principles or policies that enable the judge to range far from the original meaning.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The law and amber<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Given the unique features of the Second Amendment that gave rise to an originalist court using the \u201ctrapped in amber\u201d metaphor, one might expect it to remain trapped in Second Amendment litigation. It has not, as the examples above show.<\/p>\n<p>Only two of the above cases are Second Amendment cases, and it is telling that in both, the court found it necessary to rebuff \u201ctrapped in amber\u201d arguments, suggesting that\u00a0<em>Rahimi\u00a0<\/em>has led lower courts and\/or litigants to overcorrect. The court\u2019s two Second Amendment\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/2026\/07\/narrow-holdings-with-broad-consequences\/\">decisions<\/a>\u00a0this past term resoundingly reaffirm that Second Amendment law remains \u201ctrapped\u201d where the people fixed it.<\/p>\n<p>Beyond the Second Amendment, the phrase presents a threat to originalist reasoning if it is not handled with care. In\u00a0the two majority opinions, it was not\u00a0\u201claw\u201d which was \u201ctrapped in amber.\u201d Rather, it was \u201cour central bank\u201d and \u201ccontemporary practice.\u201d These are the things to which the law applies. Nevertheless, in\u00a0<em>Cisco Systems<\/em>, Sotomayor denied that \u201cCongress intended to trap the [Alien Tort Statute] in amber.\u201d Her statement could be read to deny that those who enact laws \u2013 whether constitutional or statutory \u2013 do not fix the laws they enact. This would be antithetical to originalism.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, Re sees the rise of the phrase as a sign that the court is reconciling itself to living constitutionalism. For the reasons I\u2019ve explained, I don\u2019t agree, but the amber metaphor could subtly work such a change.<\/p>\n<p>In her\u00a0<em>Slaughter\u00a0<\/em>dissent, Sotomayor asked, \u201cWhen, exactly is our law \u2018trapped in amber,\u2019 and when is it not?\u201d The answer is that it is always \u201ctrapped in amber,\u201d unless and until it is\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/scholarship.law.duke.edu\/cgi\/viewcontent.cgi?article=6059&amp;context=faculty_scholarship\">lawfully changed<\/a>. It endures, even as the world around it changes.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>What is \u201ctrapped in amber\u201d?An originalist explanation Anyone watching the Supreme Court this past term may have remarked on the frequency with which the justices talk about fossilized tree resin. Consider: The court in\u00a0Trump v. Cook: \u201cWe see no reason, however, why our central bank ought to be \u2018trapped in amber\u2019 any more than any &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/?p=118167\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23,24,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-118167","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-courts","category-rights","category-rkba"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/118167","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=118167"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/118167\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":118168,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/118167\/revisions\/118168"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=118167"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=118167"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/milesfortis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=118167"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}