Making Sense of the Limited Cert Grant in NYS Rifle & Pistol Association v. Corlett
Why did the Court rewrite the question presented in this Second Amendment case?
One week ago, I lamented about Heller‘s sad bar mitzvah. On April 26, the Court denied review in three Second Amendment cases concerning the rights of non-violent felons. And the Court had twice relisted NYS Rifle & Pistol Association v. Corlett. At the time, I assumed the Court had denied review, and Justice Thomas was writing yet another dissent from denial of certiorari.
Once again, the shadow docket threw a curveball. This morning the Court granted cert in the case. But the Court only granted review to a limited question presented:
Whether the State’s denial of petitioners’ applications for concealed-carry licenses for self-defense violated the Second Amendment.
As soon as I saw the grant, I started to scratch my head. Why did the Court rewrite the QP? Here is how Paul Clement framed the issue for the petitioners:
Whether the Second Amendment allows the government to prohibit ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns outside the home for self-defense.
There are at least five major differences between Clement’s QP and the Court’s QP.
First, the Court’s QP focuses on the state’s decision to deny “concealed-carry licenses” to the petitioners. Clement’s QP challenged the law on its face, and as applied. Is the Court’s decision now limited to an as-applied challenge, rather than a facial challenge? Might the Court leave open the possibility that other may-issue regimes are unconstitutional? Are there some unique aspects of the New York law that would distinguish it from other may issue regimes? Is there the possibility the Court will need to remand for further explication of the regime? Is there some evidence that the state improperly denied licenses to these particular plaintiffs? Might there be some Due Process Clause argument? Then again, the QP references the Second Amendment, so a Due Process issue would not be squarely presented. I see this slippery change as a way for the Court to issue a very, very narrow decision that will leave the issue unsettled.