Juror Perspective from the Kyle Rittenhouse Self Defense Trial ~ VIDEO

U.S.A. –-(AmmoLand.com)-— The trial of Kyle Rittenhouse was covered extensively on AmmoLand News by this correspondent. During the coverage, Kevin Mathewson of the Kenosha County Eye provided wonderful insight.  Six months after the trial, Kevin Mathewson interviewed one of the jurors who was on the Rittenhouse Jury.

As many may remember, the jury found Kyle Rittenhouse not guilty on all counts, because he was acting in justified self-defense.

Kevin Mathewson has graciously allowed this correspondent to use his article at AmmoLand News.  The insight shows the basic structure of the jury system works as it should when populated by people who believe in doing the correct thing with honor. Quotes from the Kenosha County Eye are in italics. From the Eye:

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BLUF
“Instead of leading to a ‘Wild West’ atmosphere or blood running in the streets, licensed concealed carry by law-abiding citizens helps reduce crime, and assists police officers.”

Who Would Have Guessed, Gun Control Failed in 1881 Also

An article for Smithsonian magazine (Matt Jancer, Gun Control Is as Old as the Old West), reviews the ordinances of Tombstone, Arizona, and other frontier towns in the 1880s, observing that the gun control laws of the time were imposed at the local level and that bearing arms was a “heavily regulated business.”

The notorious Gunfight at the O.K Corral arose, it seems, because “Marshall Virgil Earp, having deputized his brothers Wyatt and Morgan and his pal Doc Holliday, [was] having a gun control problem.”

Tombstone (with a population that hovered around 3,500) had enacted Ordinance No. 9, effective April 1881, to prohibit carrying any deadly weapon within city limits “without first obtaining a permit in writing.” Later that year, lawman Earp’s brothers had charged one Isaac (“Ike”) Clanton with violating the ordinance in the context of escalating animosity between Clanton, the Earps, and Holliday. Clanton’s rifle was seized, and a judge fined him $25 and another $2.50 in court costs. The sheriff later intervened to disarm Clanton’s associates, but after several demands failed to convince them to surrender their firearms. Soon after, the Earp-Holliday group converged on the Clanton-McLaurys, with Wyatt Earp allegedly declaring, “I want your guns.” A contemporary newspaper called what followed “one of the crimson days in the annals of Tombstone, a day when blood flowed as water, and human life was held as a shuttlecock.”

Tombstone of the 1880s is a peculiar model for those who today agitate for greater local authority to restrict or ban firearms.

Ike Clanton survived to file first-degree murder charges against the Earps and Holliday, claiming they had acted with criminal haste in precipitating the confrontation to kill their personal enemies. The court ruling in the preliminary hearing dismissed the charges but determined that Virgil Earp, “as chief of police” who relied on the assistance of his brother and Holliday to arrest and disarm the Clantons and McLaurys, “committed an injudicious and censurable act… and … acted incautiously and without due circumspection;” however, this was not criminally culpable given the state of affairs “incident to a frontier country,” “the supposed prevalence of bad, desperate and reckless men,” and the specific threats that had been made against the Earps.

The ordinance, in this case at least, proved to be almost entirely ineffective. As recounted in the court decision, Sheriff Behan had “demanded of the Clantons and McLaurys that they give up their arms, and … they ‘demurred,’ as he said, and did not do it.”

More significantly, modern jurisprudence on the Second Amendment confirms that, subject to limited exceptions, the right of responsible citizens to carry common firearms beyond the home, “even in populated areas, even without special need, falls within the Amendment’s coverage, indeed within its core.” The ruling, Wrenn v. District of Columbia (2017), arose out of a challenge to the District of Columbia’s concealed carry law, which restricted licenses to applicants who could satisfy a “good reason” requirement, as defined in the law (living or working in a high-crime area, for example, did not qualify). The District justified this scheme by claiming that the Second Amendment did not protect carrying in densely-populated or urban areas like Washington, D.C.

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Appeals court: illegal aliens not covered by the Second Amendment

Does the “right of the people to keep and bear arms” cover people who are in this country illegally? A three-judge panel on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals said “no” on Monday, ruling against a man who had lived in the United States for almost two decades before he was deported after being convicted on one count of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien.

Ignacio Jimenez-Shilon appealed that conviction, arguing (as he had at trial) that the federal law in question was a violation of his Second Amendment rights. The panel of judges, however, agreed with the lower court that ruled those in this country illegally don’t have a right under U.S. law to either keep or bear arms.

Jimenez’s argument to us is straightforward: (1) Even as an illegal alien, he lived in the United States for decades and was thus among “the people” whom the Second Amendment protects; and (2) as a consequence, he couldn’t be punished for exercising his individual right to possess a firearm.

But the inquiry isn’t as mechanical as Jimenez suggests. As we will explain, being a member of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment applies as a general matter is a necessary condition to enjoyment of the right to keep and bear arms, but it is not alone sufficient. The reason is that the Second Amendment’s text shows that it codified what the Heller Court called a “pre-existing right,” 554 U.S. at 592, 603—the right “to keep and bear Arms”— and that right’s particular history demonstrates that it extended (and thus extends) to some categories of individuals, but not others. Accordingly, as the Supreme Court put it in Heller, certain groups of people—even those who might be among “the people”—may be “disqualified from” possessing arms without violating the Second Amendment.

Illegal aliens, according to the judges, are among those “certain groups of people” who can be disqualified, because both the law and historical precedent in this country have made it clear that  “aliens could not surreptitiously enter a foreign nation in violation of the immigration prerogatives of the sovereign and expect to receive all the rights and protections of the citizenry. Nor can they do so today.”

In order to reach that decision the panel explored several Supreme Court precedents as well as some Founding-era history, which they say points to the idea that the right of the people to keep and bear arms was analogous to the rights of citizens to do so.

To take one example, the Federalist Papers explained that one of the bulwarks of personal liberty was the prospect of “citizens with arms in their hands.” The Federalist No. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

“If the representatives of the people” were to “betray their constituents,” Hamilton proclaimed, then it would be the natural right of the “citizens” to “rush tumultuously to arms.” The Federalist No. 28, at 176 (Alexander Hamilton); see also, e.g., 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1890, at 746 (1833) (“The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers” and “enable[s] the people to resist and triumph over them.”).

Yet when the Constitution was submitted for ratification, many feared that the lack of an express guarantee of the right to bear arms would lead to an erosion of liberty—particularly because the new charter empowered Congress to call forth the militia and raise an army and navy. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 598.

Thus, several proposals quickly emerged in the States urging the adoption of an amendment explicitly prohibiting Congress from disarming “citizens.” See Charles, Armed in America, supra, at 94; The Complete Bill of Rights, supra, at 275 (documenting the Massachusetts proposal that Congress be barred from “prevent[ing] the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms,” as well as the New Hampshire proposal that “Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion”).

One of the most interesting aspects of this case was the concurring opinion authored by Judge Kevin Newsom, who was appointed to the Eleventh Circuit by Donald Trump in 2017. As UCLA law professor Eugene Voloch pointed out at Reason, Newsom took the opportunity to discuss the current use of “tiered scrutiny” to determine the constitutionality of laws dealing with the Second Amendment.

Judge Newsom also adds a separate concurrence, in which he questions the use of strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and similar tests both as to the Second Amendment and as to other constitutional rights, such as the First Amendment. Allowing constitutional rights to be overcome by compelling or substantial government interests, he argues, “elevates the normative views of ‘we the judges’ over ‘We the People’ through an ill-defined balancing test.” And, turning to the First Amendment, he adds:

It’s not just that the [First Amendment strict scrutiny / intermediate scrutiny] doctrine is exhausting—although it certainly is that. It’s that the doctrine is judge-empowering and, I fear, freedom-diluting. If we, as judges, conclude—as I’ve said we should—that Second Amendment rights shouldn’t be casually balanced away by reference to manipulable means-ends balancing tests, we might need to start asking the bigger question: On what basis can we do exactly that when dealing with other, equally fundamental rights?

There’s a lot of speculation among Supreme Court watchers that the upcoming decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association will specifically reject the current tiered-scrutiny approach adopted by lower courts in the wake of Heller in favor of a “text, history, and tradition” test that, in the words of attorney and scholar Joseph Greenlee, “focuses on the Second Amendment’s text, using history and tradition to inform its original meaning.” It sounds like Newsom thinks that a similar approach would be valuable for the First Amendment too, though it remains to be seen if SCOTUS will actually adopt that test for Second Amendment cases going forward.