DoD’s Report on the Investigation into the 2017 Ambush in Niger
On October 4, 2017, four U.S. Army Green Berets and four Nigerien soldiers were killed in action during an ambush of a joint U.S.-Nigerien mission outside the village of Tongo Tongo, Niger. On May 11, 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) released a detailed video-graphic depiction of the ambush and an eight-page summary of a much longer classified report on the events leading up to, during, and immediately following the ambush. Given the new information provided by DoD, the public has the opportunity to consider the risks U.S. forces were operating under, as well as the lessons DoD has derived from the events and the recommendations the investigation generated.
Q1: Why did DoD conduct this investigation?
A1: The ambush marked the highest-casualty event in Africa for the U.S. military since the Black Hawk Down incident in 1993, when 18 Army Rangers lost their lives. Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jeremiah Johnson, Staff Sergeant (SSG) Bryan Black, SSG Dustin Wright, and Sergeant (SGT) LaDavid Johnson were all killed in action during the engagement with militants from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).
Immediately after the ambush, the U.S. media and some members of Congress conveyed surprise that U.S. forces were in harm’s way in Niger and wanted to know why the unit was so vulnerable in the case of an attack. Furthermore, the recovery of Sgt. LaDavid Johnson’s remains was delayed by 48 hours. Senior leaders at DoD stated that the purpose of the investigation was to understand whether mistakes were made and to provide more details to the families of the fallen. In a press conference approximately three weeks after the attack, General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained what DoD wanted to know:
We owe the families of the fallen more information, and that’s what the investigation is designed to identify. The questions include, did the mission of U.S. forces change during the operation? Did our forces have adequate intelligence, equipment and training? Was there a pre-mission assessment of the threat in the area accurate? Did U.S. force—how did U.S. forces become separated during the engagement, specifically Sergeant Johnson? And why did they take time to find and recover Sgt. Johnson?
Q2: Who conducted the investigation?
A2: U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted the investigation. Major General Roger Cloutier, AFRICOM’s chief of staff, was the lead investigator. The draft was then reviewed by General Thomas Waldhauser, commander of AFRICOM, and General Dunford before being approved by Secretary of Defense James Mattis.
Q3: Why were U.S. forces in Niger in the first place?
A3: The Trump administration, in a report required by the National Defense Authorization Act, states that U.S. forces are in Niger to “train, advise, and assist Nigerien partner forces.” During his October press conference, General Dunford was more expansive in his explanation: “Service members in Niger work as part of an international effort, led by 4,000 French troops, to defeat terrorists in west Africa. Since 2011, French and U.S. troops have trained a 5,000-person west African force and over 35,000 soldiers from the region to fight terrorists…affiliated with ISIS, Al Qaeda and Boko Haram.” The summary report echoes these statements and adds that the unit involved in the ambush were deployed to train and equip “a new Nigerien Counter Terrorism (CT) Company” and to conduct operations “with a separate Nigerien unit, until the new CT Company reached full operational capacity.” At a press conference presenting the summary report to the public, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert Karem stated that the U.S. military presence in Niger “is necessary because the establishment of terrorist safe havens in the Sahel could pose a significant risk to U.S. national security interests.” Karem also noted that the United States supports ongoing French CT operations in the region.




