RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 8

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces will continue reinforcing the Izyum-Slovyansk axis and attempting to advance to and through Slovyansk to encircle Ukrainian forces.
  • Russia is likely cohering forces in Donbas to attempt a major offensive in the coming days or weeks.
  • The Battle of Mariupol continues, and it is unclear how much longer the Ukrainian defenders can hold out.
  • Russian forces have fully vacated the Sumy axis and are regrouping in Belgorod for likely deployment to the Izyum-Slovyansk axis.
  • Some Russian forces are likely to return to home stations in Russia while others will re-enter the fighting in the east.

Ukrainian forces retain control of defensive positions in eastern and southwestern Mariupol, despite Russian claims to have captured most of the city. ISW was able to confirm the specific locations of ongoing Russian assaults on April 8 for the first time in several days. Russian forces continue to attempt to regroup and redeploy units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine to support an offensive in eastern Ukraine, but these units are unlikely to enable a Russian breakthrough and face poor morale. Russian forces along the Izyum-Slovyansk axis did not make any territorial gains in the last 24 hours. Ukrainian counterattacks toward Kherson continue to threaten Russian positions around the city.

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian forces continued to hold out against Russian assaults in areas of southwestern and eastern Mariupol, notably in the port and the Azovstal Metallurgy plant, respectively.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to repel daily Russian assaults in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
  • A Russian Tochka-U missile struck a civilian evacuation point at the Kramatorsk rail station in eastern Ukraine, killing at least 50 and wounding around a hundred evacuees.
  • Russian forces continued attacks south of Izyum toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove but did not take any new territory.
  • Ukrainian counterattacks have likely taken further territory west of Kherson, threatening Russian control of the city.

Continue reading “”

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3.

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces will likely complete their withdrawal from Kyiv along the Sumy axis in the coming days and will probably abandon their remaining positions around Konotop and Sumy thereafter.
  • Russian troops around Kharkiv will likely continue to focus on supporting the shift of the main effort via Izyum toward the southeast and may pull back from the immediate environs of the city.
  • Russian and proxy forces will attempt to increase the scope and scale of offensive operations to complete the linkup between the Kharkiv-Izyum axis and occupied Luhansk.
  • Russian forces will likely secure Mariupol in coming days, and may attempt to launch renewed offensive operations northwest from the city in an effort to seize Donetsk Oblast.

Ukraine has won the Battle of Kyiv. Russian forces are completing their withdrawal, but not in good order. Ukrainian forces are continuing to clear Kyiv Oblast of isolated Russian troops left behind in the retreat, which some Ukrainian officials describe as “lost orcs.” Russian forces had attempted to conduct an orderly retreat from their positions around Kyiv with designated covering forces supported by artillery and mines to allow the main body to withdraw. The main body of Russian troops has withdrawn from the west bank of the Dnipro and is completing its withdrawal from the east bank, but the retrograde has been sufficiently disorderly that some Russian troops were left behind.

The war is far from over and could still turn Russia’s way if the Russian military can launch a successful operation in eastern Ukraine. The current line of Russian occupation in southern and eastern Ukraine is still a significant gain in Russian-controlled territory since the start of the war. If a ceasefire or peace agreement freezes a line like the current front-line trace, Russia will be able to exert much greater pressure on Ukraine than it did before the invasion and may over time reassemble a more effective invasion force. Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kyiv is thus significant but not decisive.

The disorder of the Russian withdrawal suggests that at least some of the units now reconcentrating in Belarus and western Russia will remain combat ineffective for a protracted period. Russian troops attempting to refit after pulling back from around Kyiv will likely have to reconsolidate into their units, identify which soldiers are still present, sort out their equipment and assess its combat readiness, and generally reconstitute before they can even begin to receive replacements and new equipment and prepare for further combat operations.

Russian forces are likely abandoning the east bank of the Dnipro fully as well, withdrawing from around Chernihiv to the north and from Brovary to the east. Russian troops will likely seek to hold a salient around Konotop and Sumy long enough to allow their forces to complete their retrograde from near Kyiv but will then likely withdraw back to Russia from almost all their positions west of Kharkiv.

Moscow is attempting to concentrate reserves and some units pulled from the fight around Sumy to reinforce its offensive operations in the east but is encountering serious challenges in that effort. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Russian soldiers are resisting and in some cases refusing orders to enter or re-enter the war effort. The General Staff asserted that the two battalion tactical groups (BTGs) that moved from South Ossetia toward Donbas less than a week ago refused to fight and that plans to move them back to South Ossetia are in train.[1] The General Staff claimed that about 25 soldiers of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne Brigade refused orders to re-enter combat citing excessive losses.[2] The General Staff also asserted that commanders at various echelons in the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division have refused to participate in combat operations.[3] We have no independent verification of these reports, but they are credible in light of the losses Russian forces have suffered and of independent reports of Russian soldiers killing commanders and commanders committing suicide from earlier in the conflict.

Russian efforts to advance its offensive operations in eastern Ukraine made limited progress in the past 24 hours. Fighting continues in Mariupol and on the Izyum-Severodonetsk axis.

Key Takeaways

  • Ukraine has won the Battle of Kyiv, and Russian forces are completing their withdrawals from both the east and the west banks of the Dnipro in disorder.
  • Russian forces retreating from around Kyiv will likely need considerable time before they can return to combat.
  • Incidents of refusals of orders to engage in combat operations among Russian units continue and may lead to the redeployment of two BTGs that had arrived near Donbas within the last few days to their home stations in South Ossetia.
  • The continued existence of an independent Ukrainian state with its capital in Kyiv is no longer in question at this time, although much fighting remains and the war could still turn Russia’s way.

Continue reading “”

Close Combat Force‘ is an Army euphemism for MOSs 11B Infantry Rifleman, 12B Combat Engineer (they go out and find mines) and 19D Cavalry Scout, and there are a whole lot more than 17,052 of them, so it looks like this is – maybe – a preliminary roll out for the Ranger Regiment’s, 82nd and 101st division’s combat troops.


The US Army Program Acquisition Costs FY2023 handout notes that FY2023 sees the start of:

…funding for the procurement and fielding of 1,704 NGSW-AR, which is the planned replacement for the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) within the Close Combat Force; Procurement and fielding of 15,348 NGSW-R which is the planned replacement for the M4A1 Carbine within the Close Combat Force.US Army Set To Procure 30,000 Next Generation Squad Weapons in 2023

The whole presentation: Continue reading “”

 

Apparently Ukraine sent two (2)  – likely captured – Mi-24 helicopter gunships 25 miles inside Russia to blow up an oil tank farm in Belgorod last night.

Remember, in war, the enemy gets a vote

Putin believed his own propaganda. Does our political leadership have the same problem?

What We Can Learn From Russia’s Debacle.

If Putin had followed the advice offered in the Belmont Club just before the Ukraine War, Russia might still be a first-rank power. On Feb 21, 2022, I argued that he had no chance of conquering Ukraine and would be crazy to try. “Fears over Vladimir Putin’s threatened invasion of Ukraine continue to grow despite the fact that the effort would burst both Russia’s military and economy, not to mention ruining its foreign relations. Swallowing a poison pawn makes so little sense that UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson says Russia’s Putin may be ‘irrational,’ unable to act in his own best interests.” Invading only to fail was so absurd that I reasoned his menaces must be a bluff. Since the threat was worth more than the fulfillment, his best option was not to invade but to drag out the suspense.

Perhaps as in so many cases in history the bite is in the bark; and in this case the bark is quite real. Putin has created an “invasion-in-being.” In naval warfare, the analogous concept of a “fleet in being” is a force that projects menace without ever leaving port. Were it to fight it might lose and no longer influence but while it remains in port, one is forced to guard against it. …

Putin has been doing the same thing on land. His armies are essentially “in port” — inside Russia or the Kremlin’s client states. Meanwhile Ukraine and the West are in an uproar, evacuating their citizens, canceling airline flights — never enjoying a moment’s mental security. Yet Putin can keep the invasion-in-being poised and the resulting disruption going indefinitely.

Once Putin showed his hand and it proved a bust, he would lose all power to bluff (just like movie monsters made with cheap special effects become ridiculous when finally shown onscreen), and the myth of the mighty Red Army would be dispelled for decades. I wrote that “if he actually invades in a recognizable way the uncertainty is removed and the West knows what to do about aging overreaching dictators who’ve started something they can’t afford. By preserving ambiguity Putin has Biden spellbound.” I was right about the strategic situation but wrong about Putin. He actually did do the stupid thing and dug himself a hole that he will be a long time getting out of.

In a counterfactual world where the Russian president agreed with this site and continued to feint, where NATO was still in awe of the supposedly unstoppable Russian army and Putin still hitting Biden up for nickels and dimes to keep him from unleashing it, the Kremlin might still be the capital of a great power. But it would be no more substantial than a fleet-in-being that is nine-tenths shadow and one part solid is; a thing powerful only in narrative. For in truth, Russia fell a long time ago with its crashing demography; its uncompetitive, oligarch-ridden industries; its incompetent autocratic leadership. Ukraine was a mirror into which Putin dared look when a man of his mien ought not. But whether he looked or not he was ugly just the same.

If there’s any lesson in this for Washington, it must be to ask: how much of America’s power is a myth, like Russia’s? Dare we collapse the wave function? If too much is spin, then put it not to the test, but keep on bluffing until the reality is restored. You can’t live in the narrative forever.

Books: The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict by Elbridge A. Colby. He was the lead architect of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the most significant revision of U.S. defense strategy in a generation. Here he lays out how America’s defense must change to address China’s growing power and ambition. Based firmly in the realist tradition but deeply engaged in current policy, this book offers a clear framework for what America’s goals in confronting China must be, how its military strategy must change, and how it must prioritize these goals over its lesser interests. The most informed and in-depth reappraisal of America’s defense strategy in decades, this book outlines a rigorous but practical approach, showing how the United States can prepare to win a war with China that we cannot afford to lose—precisely in order to deter that war from happening.

1 dead, 2 rescued after Navy plane crashes in water in Accomack County

ACCOMACK COUNTY, Va. (WAVY) — One person is dead and two others were rescued after a U.S. Navy E2-D crashed near Chincoteague in Accomack County Wednesday night, according to military officials.

Lt. Cmdr. Rob Myers, a public affairs officer with Naval Air Force Atlantic, said the plane was doing a routine exercise when it went down around 7:30 p.m.

Three people were on board in total. Two injured people were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard and one was found dead in the aircraft, Myers said.

The plane is based out of Naval Station Norfolk and assigned to an East Coast Airborne Command and Control Squadron.

Naval Air Force Atlantic Public Affairs said the two crewmembers have injuries that aren’t considered life-threatening.

The name of the deceased crew member will be released once next of kin is notified.

The Navy said the incident is under investigation.

Well, until the next one. Because if there’s one thing learned, it’s that the next war will be different than can be imagined, or ‘properly’ prepared for. That’s why you always hear ‘they trained to fight the last war’


Ukraine Changes the Face of War Forever

There’s a powerful David vs. Goliath lesson emerging from Russia’s brazen, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine that should give deep pause to global superpowers who still think they can simply muscle the world into any shape they want.

Every Russian tank that gets fried in Ukraine is sending the message that traditional armies can no longer expect to dominate simply because they have more troops, weapons, and money. Russian armored vehicles are falling victim to Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapons (NLAWs), which can be carried by individual soldiers, unslung in seconds, and deployed with little training and fatal accuracy. There are credible reports that Russia has already lost $5 billion worth of military equipment in a month of fighting in Ukraine. The human cost for Russia is even more staggering: Nearly 10,000 soldiers have been killed in action, including at least five generals.

That’s the reality of contemporary warfare: Smaller, nimbler groups fighting back effectively against lumbering, dumb relics of the past. Despite being the fifth largest fighting force on the planet and starting the war with five times the number of active military as Ukraine, Russia has been stymied in what virtually all observers expected to be a cakewalk.

This isn’t to say that Russia isn’t also inflicting massive, horrific violence against Ukraine—or that it won’t prevail in this conflict, especially the longer things drag on. But this war underscores what James Dale Davidson and William Rees-Mogg called the changing “logic of violence” and “the diminishing returns to violence” in their prophetic 1997 book The Sovereign Individual.

As weapons have become smaller, cheaper, more effective, and more widely dispersed, it’s harder and harder for old-style militaries and countries to quickly and effectively achieve their objectives through brute force as they meet resistance at every turn. That resistance includes “information warfare”—which includes hacking and cyber attacks—but also the use of social media, which Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy has excelled at to project an aura of invincibility and to cast the conflict in stark terms of good vs. evil.

This lesson shouldn’t be new to Americans, as our failures over the past two decades in Afghanistan and Iraq underscored the new reality that old-school invasion and occupation is more expensive and temporary than it is quick and effective. But Russia’s incompetence drives home in graphic detail to us—and, one hopes, to the Chinese officials supposedly eyeing an invasion of Taiwan—that even if Goliath does take out David, the price is too high and the victory too transient to bother undertaking.

If the collapse of the Soviet Union—that gargoyle incarnation of belief in top-down authority, power, and decision-making—was the beginning of the end of the 20th century’s romance with the nation-state, then Russia’s blundering in Ukraine and the United States’ disasters in central Asia and the Middle East may be its epitaph.

The future belongs not to the ignorant armies of the night who seek to command and control but to those who embrace and empower the decentralization of weapons, technology, information, currency, and individual ingenuity and courage.

Ukraine: The small town which managed to block Russia’s big plans

Voznesensk defenders

It was one of the most decisive battles of the war so far – a ferocious two-day struggle for control of the farming town of Voznesensk and its strategically important bridge.

Victory would have enabled Russian forces to sweep further west along the Black Sea coast towards the huge port of Odesa and a major nuclear power plant.

Instead, Ukrainian troops, supported by an eclectic army of local volunteers, delivered a crushing blow to Russian plans, first by blowing up the bridge and then by driving the invading army back, up to 100km, to the east.

“It’s hard to explain how we did it. It’s thanks to the fighting spirit of our local people and to the Ukrainian army,” said Voznesensk’s 32-year-old mayor, Yevheni Velichko, standing in body armour with his guards outside the town hall.

But almost three weeks after that battle, the mayor warned that another attack by Russian forces was probably imminent and that the town’s defenders lacked the weapons to hold them off a second time.

Continue reading “”

BLUF:
Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming weeks.
  • Russia will expand its air, missile, and artillery bombardments of Ukrainian cities.
  • Ukrainian officials suggest that Ukrainian forces may launch a larger counterattack in western Kyiv Oblast in the coming days.
  • The continued involvement of the Black Sea Fleet in the Battle of Mariupol reduces the likelihood of an amphibious landing near Odesa, Russian naval shelling of Odesa in recent days notwithstanding.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces continued to settle in for a protracted and stalemated conflict over the last 24 hours, with more reports emerging of Russian troops digging in and laying mines—indications that they have gone over to the defensive. Ukrainian forces continued to conduct limited and effective counterattacks to relieve pressure on Kyiv, although the extent of those counterattacks is likely less than what some Ukrainian officials are claiming. Russian efforts to mobilize additional forces to keep their offensive moving continue to be halting and limited. Russian progress in taking Mariupol city remains slow and grinding. Increasing Russian emphasis on using air, artillery, and rocket/missile bombardments of Ukrainian cities to offset forward offensive momentum raises the urgency of providing Ukraine with systems to defend against these attacks.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces continue to go over to the defensive, conducting restricted and localized ground attacks that make little progress.
  • Ukrainian forces are conducting limited and successful counterattacks around Kyiv to disrupt Russian operations to encircle the city (which has now become extremely unlikely) and relieve the pressure on the capital.
  • The Battle of Mariupol continues as a block-by-block struggle with fierce Ukrainian resistance and limited Russian gains.
  • Russia is likely struggling to obtain fresh combat power from Syria and elsewhere rapidly.

Click here to expand the map below.

Continue reading “”

How Ukraine Snipers Are Picking off Russian Generals One by One

These are challenging – and suddenly quite deadly — days to be a general leading Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

Outnumbered, outmatched, and outgunned, after three full weeks of combat, Ukrainian forces have managed to stymie Russian advances across the country, which is about nine-tenths the size of Texas.

Even worse for Russian strategies and morale, nearly a dozen senior officers are believed to have been killed, including five generals, along with what intelligence estimates to be about 7,000 Russian dead.

In addition, unconfirmed reports say four more generals have been sacked back in Moscow over the poor showing of what is the world’s third-largest army, but has turned out so far to be the second-best in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces even pulled off a nervy commando raid damaging an airbase inside Russia. And in next-door Belarus, a band of somebodies has been sabotaging the signal systems on rail lines transporting supplies to the Russian invaders.

This, the largest armed combat in Europe in 77 years, has created as many as an estimated four million refugees out of a 44 million population.

Presumably or hopefully, the Pentagon is up close studying Russian forces, strategies, the tactical preferences of certain senior officers, and the performance/weaknesses of equipment that NATO forces might someday themselves encounter.

But how has Ukraine managed so far to hold off such a superior foreign invading army and, importantly, kill so many senior officers?

A senior U.S. general, now retired, provided some professional insights Sunday. Gen. David Petraeus, former commanding officer of CentComm and allied forces in both Iraq and Afghanistanwarned not to go just by the size of military forces in this conflict:

Everybody wants to say, well, the Russians have, I don’t know, 200,000, and the Ukrainians have 100,000. It’s not so.

The Ukrainians have 100,000, plus every other adult, just about, in the country, all of whom are willing to take up arms or help in some way, even if it’s just jam radio signals or conduct vlogging.

They call Russians in Russia and say, do you know how poorly this is going for you?

Petraeus said the invasion has become “a stalemate, a bloody stalemate” and a war of attrition.

Continue reading “”

Appears the Ukes are TCOB. They may lose in the end, but they’re sure making Putin pay for it.


Did the true number of Russian troop deaths in Ukraine just leak?

I can’t understand how, or why, a pro-Kremlin paper would publish a number like this. As juicy as it is, surely they would have realized how embarrassing it is for their masters and what sort of consequences there might be for revealing it.

I can’t understand either who would have leaked it, as this information must be closely held.

And frankly, given how incompetent the Russians seem and how indifferent they are to loss of life, I’m surprised they’re keeping a count of their own fallen troops to begin with.

But the figure is shocking if true. In less than a month of war, this would easily exceed the number of U.S. KIA in Iraq and Afghanistan, two conflicts that spanned nearly 30 years combined.

The Red Army lost 15,000 men during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Over 10 years.

As gaudy as the apparently leaked number is, it’s in line with other estimates. Five days ago, sources in U.S. intelligence told the Times they believed 7,000 Russians had been killed — conservatively.

Continue reading “”

It would be an easy conversion, you don’t have to ask how I know.


US Army Seeks a M240 6.8mm Conversion Kit

US Army Seeks a M240 6.8mm Conversion Kit

The US Army has released a sources sought notice for a 6.8mm conversion kit for the M240B and M240L machine guns. The kit will convert the weapons from 7.62x51mm to the 6.8mm round which wins the Next Generation Squad Weapon program. The move is essentially market research to find vendors who might be capable of providing kits that include all necessary parts to convert the 7.62x51mm M240s to the new round. This might include barrels, gas systems, action springs and bolt assembly parts.

The US Army’s Army Contracting Command, based at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey is conducting the  sources sought notice on behalf of the Project Manager Soldier Lethality (PMSL). The short description of the capability sought states that “the durability, reliability, and function of the M240 weapon platform cannot be significantly compromised with a change in ammunition.” There is no mention of the type of ammunition be it SIG Sauer’s hybrid metal cased round or True Velocity’s polymer cased round. The notice states, in capitals: “A TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE (TDP) WILL NOT BE PROVIDED IN SUPPORT OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT.”

US Army Contracting Command state that:

The conversion kit should include all hardware and instructions needed to modify a standard M240B and/or M240L to fire the 6.8mm ammunition. This will include a new barrel assembly and may include changes to the weapon powering through updates to the gas regulator, drive spring, or other means. The barrel assembly may be either of the standard barrel length (M240B) or short barrel (M240L). Information on 6.8mm ammunition type, specifications, and availability should be provided.

US Army Seeks a M240 6.8mm Conversion Kit

M240B in TV 6.8mm (True Velocity)

We do know that True Velocity have demonstrated a capability to convert legacy weapon systems to chamber their 6.8mm TV round. Back in June 2021, they announced that they had successfully converted M40s, M134 Miniguns and the M110 and Knights Armament LAMG to chamber the 6.8mm round.

The notice was launched on 15 March and runs through until the end of the month. Vendors submitting to the notice have been asked to provide information on their ability to scale up manufacturing and production of kits to higher quantities but the notice shouldn’t be considered a request for proposal.

US military aircraft crashes in Norway with 4 on board

A U.S. military plane carrying four people crashed in northern Norway on Friday. Officials said they found “no signs of life” after reaching the crash site hours later.

The U.S. Marines confirmed the crash in a statement on Twitter early Friday evening.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 17:

March 17, 5:30pm ET

Russian forces did not make any major advances and Ukrainian forces carried out several local counterattacks on March 17.[1] Russian forces made little territorial progress and continued to deploy reserve elements—including from the 1st Guards Tank Army and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade—in small force packets that are unlikely to prove decisive. Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties around Kharkiv, and Russian attempts to bypass the city of Izyum are unlikely to succeed. Russian forces continued assaults on Mariupol on March 17 but did not conduct any other successful advances from Crimea.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces continue to make steady territorial gains around Mariupol and are increasingly targeting residential areas of the city.
  • Ukrainian forces northwest of Kyiv launched several local counterattacks and inflicted heavy damage on Russian forces.
  • Ukrainian forces repelled Russian operations around Kharkiv and reported killing a regimental commander.
  • Ukrainian intelligence reports that Russia may have expended nearly its entire store of precision cruise missiles in the first twenty days of its invasion.
  • Russian forces deployed unspecified reserve elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army and Baltic Fleet Naval Infantry to northeastern Ukraine on March 17.
  • Russia may be parceling out elements of the reserve force that could conduct an amphibious operation along the Black Sea coast to support ongoing assaults on Mariupol, further reducing the likelihood of a Russian amphibious assault on Odesa.
  • Ukrainian forces shot down 10 Russian aircraft—including five jets, three helicopters, and two UAVs—on March 16, and Ukrainian forces continue to successfully contest Russian air operations.

Russian forces face mounting difficulties replacing combat casualties and replacing expended munitions. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on March 17 that Russian forces will begin another wave of mobilization for the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) 1st Army Corps on March 20.[2] Ukrainian intelligence continued to report Russian forces face difficulties manning both combat and support units and increasing desertion rates.[3] The General Staff further reported that Russian forces are increasingly using indiscriminate weapons against residential areas because they used almost their entire supply of “Kalibr” and “Iskander” cruise missiles in the first 20 days of the invasion.[4] It is unclear if the Ukrainian General Staff means Russian forces have used almost all precision munitions earmarked for the operation in Ukraine or almost all missiles in Russia’s total arsenal—though likely the former.

Continue reading “”

1 I think Putin believed his own propaganda.
2 From this performance, it begs the question if the Russian military ever really was the threat we always believed it was, and spent so much time, effort and money on defending against it. Well, the military/industrial complex sure made a fortune.


BLUF:
Russia—whose economy before the invasion was about the size of Italy’s—may have spread its efforts too thinly and the modernization effort also appears to have been undermined by fraud and corruption, said analysts including Michael Clarke, a former director of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think tank, and now associate director of the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, citing estimates that some 25% of the invading force are conscripts.

Weapons systems haven’t performed well and commanders pretended they had capabilities that weren’t there, Mr. Clarke said. Of Russia’s effort to create a “large, modern army,” he said: “The part which is modern is not large, and the part which is large is not modern.”

How Russia’s Revamped Military Fumbled the Invasion of Ukraine
Moscow spent years upgrading its capabilities, only to see the armed forces fail their first major test, confounding earlier Western assessments and giving Ukraine a boost

For over a decade, Russia spent hundreds of billions of dollars restructuring its military into a smaller, better equipped and more-professional force that could face off against the West.
Three weeks into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its first big test, the armed forces have floundered. Western intelligence estimated last week that 5,000 to 6,000 Russian troops had been killed, some of them poorly trained conscripts.
The dead included four Russian generals—one-fifth of the number estimated to be in Ukraine—along with other senior commanders, according to a Western official and Ukrainian military reports. The generals were close to the front lines, some Western officials said, a sign that lower ranks in forward units were likely unable to make decisions or fearful of advancing.
Russian troops turned to using open telephone and analog radios following the failure of encrypted communications systems, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry has said, making them vulnerable to intercept or jamming. Russian officers were likely targeted after their positions were exposed by their use of open communications, Western military analysts said.
In the strategically located town of Voznesensk, Ukrainian forces comprising local volunteers and the professional military drove off an attack early this month, in one of the most comprehensive routs Russian forces have suffered since invading Ukraine.
Russia’s failings appear to trace to factors ranging from the Kremlin’s wrong assumptions about Ukrainian resistance to the use of poorly motivated conscript soldiers. They suggest that Russia and the West overestimated Moscow’s overhauls of its armed forces, which some military analysts say appear to have been undermined by graft and misreporting.
The military’s previous outings in staged maneuvers and smaller operations in Syria didn’t prepare it for a multipronged attack into a country with a military fiercely defending its homeland, said Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies at CNA, a nonprofit research organization based in Arlington, Va.
“The failures that we’re seeing now is them having to work with a larger force than they’ve ever employed in real combat conditions as opposed to an exercise,” he said. “These exercises that we’ve been shown over the years are very scripted events and closer to theater than anything else.”

Continue reading “”

“In 36 days of fighting on Iwo Jima during World War II, nearly 7,000 Marines were killed. Now, 20 days after President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia invaded Ukraine, his military has already lost more soldiers…”

“… according to American intelligence estimates. The conservative side of the estimate, at more than 7,000 Russian troop deaths, is greater than the number of American troops killed over 20 years in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. It is a staggering number amassed in just three weeks of fighting, American officials say, with implications for the combat effectiveness of Russian units, including soldiers in tank formations. Pentagon officials say a 10 percent casualty rate, including dead and wounded, for a single unit renders it unable to carry out combat-related tasks…. ‘Losses like this affect morale and unit cohesion, especially since these soldiers don’t understand why they’re fighting,’ said Evelyn Farkas, the top Pentagon official for Russia and Ukraine during the Obama administration… ‘It is stunning, and the Russians haven’t even gotten to the worst of it, when they hit urban combat in the cities,’ [said] Representative Jason Crow, Democrat of Colorado….”

From “As Russian Troop Deaths Climb, Morale Becomes an Issue, Officials Say/More than 7,000 Russian troops have been killed in less than three weeks of fighting, according to conservative U.S. estimates” (NYT).

Quip O’ The Day
“Hope we spend more time on propulsion than on pronouns.”


Moon battle: New Space Force plans raise fears over militarizing the lunar surface.

The battle is on for the moon.
The U.S. military is investing in new technologies to build large structures on the lunar surface. It’s designing a spy satellite to orbit the moon. And it just announced plans for a surveillance network — what it calls a “highway patrol” — for the vast domain between Earth’s orbit and the moon, known as cislunar space. Top military strategists and documents, meanwhile, now consistently refer to this region as a new realm of operations.
The funding is also starting to flow. The government spending bill passed by Congress this week added $61 million for the military to pursue projects in cislunar space.
“That’s basically the first significant chunk of money that we’re putting towards this,” said Space Force Col. Eric Felt, commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico.
He likened it to “putting the toe into the water, but we think this is an important potential future tech area.”
“From the Space Force’s perspective,” he added, “they don’t know how big of a deal this is going to be in the future, but it could be a big deal.”
The Pentagon maintains these new pursuits, all launched since the creation of the Space Force three years ago, are primarily designed to help secure a growing private space economy and safeguard civilian astronauts. In all, the newest branch believes nation-states and commercial companies will fly nearly 100 missions — both crewed and uncrewed — to the moon between now and 2030.
But space policy and security experts also fear that the armed forces could outstrip NASA in space exploration and thrust what has largely been a peaceful competition into a military contest.
Aaron Boley, co-director of Outer Space Institute at the University of British Columbia, says the Pentagon already plays an outsized role in Earth orbit, where satellites are used to support military operations and global security.
“But once we move to the moon, this should really be driven by civilian organizations to ensure that peaceful purposes are maintained,” he said.
Some leading military strategists, however, say there is simply too much at stake in the space race to leave it to civilians, and that the Pentagon will likely be compelled to take on a bigger role.
China’s space agency has made significant strides in its plan to develop the moon, including landing the first spacecraft on the south pole in 2019. It also plans at least three additional robotic missions, beginning in 2024, to build a lunar base, with missions involving taikonauts to follow.
Proponents for a more muscular U.S. military say they fear China cannot be trusted to pursue only peaceful aims and could use its space program for both economic and military advantage, including a new partnership with Russia to build a moon base.
“Power abhors a vacuum,” said Peter Garretson, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and space strategist who is now a senior fellow in defense studies at the American Foreign Policy Council. “You should expect that other actors will act in ways that favor their interests to the exclusion of others.”
“I think we all hope that NASA will rise to the occasion again and be able to perform that traditional exploration role,” he added. “But with the slipping of budgets and slipping the timelines, I think there is some concern as to whether or not NASA is scaling its efforts and will be able to rise to the occasion.”
The Space Force maintains it is interested only in developing the means for “domain awareness,” not exploration.

Continue reading “”

BLUF:
My guess is that the Russian infantry massing around Kiev isn’t even going to enter the city. They know what sort of losses they’d take in urban combat; there’s no reason to think they could outfight the Ukrainians on their own streets. More likely is that they’re going to lay siege to the capital a la Mariupol and wait for a surrender. The outcome of the war may turn on whether Russia is capable of doing that successfully or whether Ukrainian troops outside the city can mount the sort of counteroffensive described above to break the siege. If they can, the Russians will be faced with a scenario in which they can neither starve the Ukrainians into submission nor overpower them in combat. Maybe that’s when Fukuyama’s prediction of morale “vaporizing” comes true.

But it’s also when things would get really dangerous.

Is Russia going to lose?
One way to answer the question in the headline is “It already has.” Even to a rank amateur like me, it was clear by *day three* that Putin was facing a strategic debacle. He misjudged Ukraine’s desire and ability to resist, he misjudged the strength of his military, and he misjudged the west’s willingness to paralyze Russia’s economy with sanctions. “No Russian leader since Tsar Nicholas II has done his country so much harm, so fast, as Vladimir Putin,” David Frum tweeted a few days ago, marveling at how diminished Russian power has been by Putin’s folly in the span of a few weeks.

Nothing that happens in Ukraine from this point will undo that. It’s a fiasco.

But a strategic defeat is distinct from defeat on the battlefield. Even optimists have assumed that Russia would eventually brute-force its way to controlling Kiev and other major Ukrainian cities. The “real” fight for Ukraine would come after that when Russia’s occupying forces and Ukraine’s insurgency would wage a war of attrition. Eventually Moscow would run out of patience and withdraw, but “eventually” could take months. Years. Decades, conceivably.

But what if the optimists were too pessimistic? What if Russia is facing near-term defeat on the battlefield as well?

Realistically, there are three ways in which the Russian army might lose:

Continue reading “”

“Appear strong when you are weak.” ― Sun Tzu, The Art of War


What If Everyone Is Wrong About The Russian Military?

As a kid, the only thing close to as tough as the United States military was those communist bastards they were protecting us from. We were tougher, of course, but since we were the good guys we didn’t even consider invading them. Should they invade us, which we knew they wanted to do, we’d be ready to kick some commie ass! At least, that’s what we told ourselves, mostly to avoid thinking about the complete, total and world-wide nuclear annulation. Times have changed, and so has the Russian military…or has it?

We always assumed they were as strong militarily as we were, but mostly because of parades and their size. Everyone has seen the footage of battalions marching through Red Square, huge intercontinental ballistic missiles rolling along with them in a sea of soldiers and tanks. They sure projected strength and readiness. But maybe they weren’t ready?

All we really had to go on was the Soviet Union’s word, their propaganda videos, and the fact that they could push around so small countries. But maybe they were a super-power based solely on their huge nuclear arsenal?

We never really saw the Soviets take on another organized military, their power was largely acquired through propping up dictators and intimidation – they were very good at disappearing the disloyal and beating up the weak.

We were told they were strong, minus the nukes, mostly because they were big, and that assumption continues to this day. But their actions in Ukraine are not that of a world-class military, not by a long-shot. It’s more like a drunken douchebag indiscriminately launching rockets, quite possibly because they lack anything with precision. We can drop a missile down a chimney with the accuracy of Santa Claus, but what if the Russians couldn’t even hit a brick in a brick factory?

Remember what we were told about the Republican Guard in Iraq? They were the “best of the best.” Pick your Gulf War, when they started the story was about how we’d have no real issues with the regular Iraqi troops, but when we encountered the Republican Guard things would get hairy. They never did. The Republican Guard was as insignificant as the regular army. Both times the people in charge were completely wrong about what we were up against, the RG folded like a cheap tent. Could history be repeating itself with Russia?

Continue reading “”