All successes, even (and maybe especially) that of opponents, should be studied for lessons to be learned.
Hamas attack exposes gaping eye-in-the-sky blind spots
Crucial gaps in satellite surveillance coverage underline need for more integrated US system – including to foresee a China invasion of Taiwan
Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel has exposed the limits of space-based surveillance, putting into question the adequacy of existing heavenly watch intelligence-gathering technologies and spotlighting the need for a more integrated approach that better synergizes artificial intelligence (AI) with human guidance and insight.
Defense One reported that the recent Hamas assault on Israel has highlighted the need for persistent coverage from orbit, as space-based sensors are not a “cure-all” for US intelligence needs.
The report says that while the US Pentagon via the Space Development Agency has commenced building a network of military satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) known as the “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,” Hamas’ ability to avoid detection will likely spur nations to increase the capacity and coverage of their space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, including those that use radiofrequency sensing.
Defense One notes that while the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is working with other intelligence agencies to ensure that US satellites are capable and relevant and that it remains confident in its ability to detect threats around the world, officials are still investigating why preparations for the attack went undetected while seeking further intelligence on Iran’s possible role in the assault.
The report says that Hamas appears to have used “old-school techniques” such as in-person communications to share information. Defense One notes that relying on ISR techniques that use technology to remote-monitor adversaries can be dodged if the subject can avoid signals or movements easily detected and analyzed from space or electronic sensors.
The report also suggests that the US should use more AI-enabled algorithms to assess information including human intelligence, social media posts and physical movements.
Space-based ISR has several advantages over other intelligence-gathering systems. Asia Times noted in September 2023 that countries with space-based surveillance have a lower risk of invasion by other nations, as they are less likely to experience surprise military attacks and thus less vulnerable to major militarized disputes.
Spy satellites provide real-time data and images that allow for quick detection of suspicious and potentially threatening activities and movements. They also offer accurate monitoring and identification of potential targets, making them cost-effective for tracking ships and aircraft in remote areas.
Israel is highly aware of those advantages and has built formidable space-based ISR capabilities. In the 2015 book Handbook of Space Security, Deganit Paikowsky and other writers note that Israel adopts a pragmatic approach to space power that focuses on intelligence and operational capabilities while seeking regional dominance in niche areas such as Earth observation, LEO launch capability and communications.
Paikowsky and others mention that Israel’s security doctrine is based on three principles: deterrence, early warning and decisive victory, stressing that aiming to deter war and ensure early warning intelligence is vital for Israel’s national security.
They add that Israel’s space program is essential for observing enemy territory from space, seemingly providing a technological solution to Israel’s military problem. They also mention that satellite-derived intelligence is considered a tremendous strategic equalizer, increasing transparency among states and diminishing the sense of uncertainty, thus reducing the risk of surprise.
While Paikowsky and others say that Israel depends on US political support and economic aid, it has significant autonomy over its intelligence capacity. That, the writers argue, enhances Israel’s power, image and flexibility in decision-making. Along those lines, they note Israel’s capability to develop and launch ISR satellites such as the Ofek series.
However, the recent Hamas attacks surprised and shocked the international community, as Israel has long been thought to have one of the world’s most sophisticated ISR capabilities. Not since 1973 has Israel been caught unprepared for such a large-scale attack.
In an article this month for the New York Times, Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley note that Israel’s failure to pre-empt the Hamas attacks can be traced to failing to monitor Palestinian attackers’ communication channels, overreliance on remote-controlled border surveillance equipment, clustering key commanders in a vulnerable border base and accepting assertions by Gazan military leaders that they were not preparing for battle.
Bergman and Kingsley suggest that Israeli security chiefs made incorrect assumptions about the threat Hamas posed to Israel from Gaza. They say Hamas stayed out of two fights in the past year and gave the impression it was de-escalating by ending a period of border rioting in an agreement brokered by Qatar last month.
Furthermore, they say Israel’s remote-controlled border surveillance system gave a false sense of security, pointing out that the system could be destroyed remotely. They point out that Hamas used drones to attack the cellular towers that transmitted signals to and from the system.
Moreover, Bergman and Kingsley also report that due to clustering key commanders in one vulnerable base, once the base was overrun, most of the senior officers were killed, injured or taken hostage. They say the loss of key officers, compounded with communication problems caused by drone strikes, prevented a coordinated response.
Javed Ali in an article this month for The Conversation points out Israeli organizational and strategic shortcomings. In particular, he notes that Israel does not have a centralized intelligence analysis agency similar to the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), possibly resulting in a fragmented approach to intelligence gathering and analysis.
Ali also notes that while the US and Israel have deep intelligence cooperation, Washington’s preoccupation with Russia and China may have made intelligence cooperation with Israel a lower priority.
These operational, organizational and strategic lapses in intelligence-gathering may provide valuable lessons for other major conflict hotspots including the Taiwan Strait.
In an October 2022 article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, John Culver notes that if China were preparing to invade Taiwan, there should be reliable pre-invasion indicators. According to Culver, China will increase its production of essential weapons like missiles, anti-aircraft systems, air-to-air weapons and long-range rockets for beach attacks in the lead-up to any invasion.
He also mentions near-term indicators of an approaching conflict, including financial elements such as the imposition of stronger cross-border capital controls, a freeze on foreign financial assets within China and rapid liquidation and repatriation of Chinese assets held abroad.
Culver says that China’s leaders probably would prepare their people psychologically for the costs of war, including austerity, tens of thousands of combat deaths and civilian deaths from US and Taiwan-launched strikes. He notes that if the US intelligence community saw some of this happening, they would likely release that information publicly, just as they did almost four months before Russia invaded Ukraine.
In terms of military preparations, Culver writes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would implement a PLA-wide stop-loss six to 12 months before the invasion, thus halting the demobilization of enlisted personnel and officers.
Will current US satellite surveillance foresee the signs of a pending Chinese invasion of Taiwan? Image: Facebook
He says the PLA would also halt most regular training and maintenance on major equipment and expand its capacity to rearm, resupply and repair ships, submarines and aircraft away from military facilities that the US or Taiwan would likely bomb.
Furthermore, he says that the PLA Eastern and Southern Theater Commands would take preparation steps rarely seen in mere exercises such as establishing field hospitals close to embarkation points and airfields, conducting public blood drives and deploying mobile command posts to support vehicle preparation at civilian ports.
He notes that the PLA would also signal it is preparing to invade by canceling leave and disrupting regular flights, predicting that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would seek to mobilize the country at least three to four months before any planned combat. Culver also mentions that provincial military-civilian committees would likely seek to take control of commercial ships, transport ships, aircraft, trains and trucks in preparation for war.